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Abstract: TLS 1.3 is the next version of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Its
clean-slate design is a reaction both to the increasing demand for low-latency HTTPS connections
and to a series of recent high-profile attacks on TLS. The hope is that a fresh protocol with modern
cryptography will prevent legacy problems; the danger is that it will expose new kinds of attacks,
or reintroduce old flaws that were fixed in previous versions of TLS. After 18 drafts, the protocol
is nearing completion, and the working group has appealed to researchers to analyze the protocol
before publication. This paper responds by presenting a comprehensive analysis of the TLS 1.3
Draft-18 protocol.
We seek to answer three questions that have not been fully addressed in previous work on TLS 1.3:
(1) Does TLS 1.3 prevent well-known attacks on TLS 1.2, such as Logjam or the Triple Handshake,
even if it is run in parallel with TLS 1.2? (2) Can we mechanically verify the computational security
of TLS 1.3 under standard (strong) assumptions on its cryptographic primitives? (3) How can we
extend the guarantees of the TLS 1.3 protocol to the details of its implementations?
To answer these questions, we propose a methodology for developing verified symbolic and com-
putational models of TLS 1.3 hand-in-hand with a high-assurance reference implementation of the
protocol. We present symbolic ProVerif models for various intermediate versions of TLS 1.3 and
evaluate them against a rich class of attacks to reconstruct both known and previously unpublished
vulnerabilities that influenced the current design of the protocol. We present a computational Cryp-
toVerif model for TLS 1.3 Draft-18 and prove its security. We present RefTLS, an interoperable
implementation of TLS 1.0-1.3 and automatically analyze its protocol core by extracting a ProVerif
model from its typed JavaScript code.
Key-words: security protocols, verification, symbolic model, computational model, implemen-
tation, TLS
Modèles vérifiés et implémentations de référence
pour le candidat standard TLS 1.3
Résumé : TLS 1.3 est la prochaine version du protocole TLS (Transport Layer Security).
Sa conception à partir de zéro est une réaction à la fois à la demande croissante de connexions
HTTPS à faible latence et à une série d’attaques récentes de haut niveau sur TLS. L’espoir est
qu’un nouveau protocole avec de la cryptographie moderne éviterait d’hériter des problèmes des
versions précédentes; le danger est que cela pourrait exposer à de nouveaux types d’attaques ou
réintroduire d’anciens défauts corrigés dans les versions précédentes de TLS. Après 18 versions
préliminaires, le protocole est presque terminé, et le groupe de travail a appelé les chercheurs à
analyser le protocole avant publication. Cet article répond en présentant une analyse globale du
protocole TLS 1.3 Draft-18.
Nous cherchons à répondre à trois questions qui n’ont pas été entièrement traitées dans les
travaux antérieurs sur TLS 1.3: (1) TLS 1.3 empêche-t-il les attaques connues sur TLS 1.2,
comme Logjam ou Triple Handshake, même s’il est exécuté en parallèle avec TLS 1.2 ? (2) Peut-
on vérifier mécaniquement la sécurité calculatoire de TLS 1.3 sous des hypothèses standard
(fortes) sur ses primitives cryptographiques? (3) Comment pouvons-nous étendre les garanties
du protocole TLS 1.3 aux détails de ses implémentations?
Pour répondre à ces questions, nous proposons une méthodologie pour développer des mod-
èles symboliques et calculatoires vérifiés de TLS 1.3 en même temps qu’une implémentation de
référence du protocole. Nous présentons des modèles symboliques dans ProVerif pour différentes
versions intermédiaires de TLS 1.3 et nous les évaluons contre une riche classe d’attaques, pour
reconstituer à la fois des vulnérabilités connues et des vulnérabilités précédemment non publiées
qui ont influencé la conception actuelle du protocole. Nous présentons un modèle calculatoire
dans CryptoVerif de TLS 1.3 Draft-18 et prouvons sa sécurité. Nous présentons RefTLS, une
implémentation interopérable de TLS 1.0-1.3 et analysons automatiquement le coeur de son
protocole en extrayant un modèle ProVerif à partir de son code JavaScript typé.
Mots-clés : protocoles cryptographiques, vérification, modèle symbolique, modèle calculatoire,
implémentation, TLS
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1 Introduction
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is widely used to establish secure channels on the
Internet. It was first proposed under the name SSL [51] in 1994, and has undergone a series of
revisions since, leading up to the standardization of TLS 1.2 [41] in 2008. Each version adds new
features, deprecates obsolete constructions, and introduces countermeasures for weaknesses found
in previous versions. The behavior of the protocol can be further customized via extensions, some
of which are mandatory to prevent known attacks on the protocol.
One may expect that TLS clients and servers would use only the latest version of the protocol
with all security-critical extensions enabled. In practice, however, many legacy variants of the
protocol continue to be supported for backwards compatibility, and the everyday use of TLS
depends crucially on clients and servers negotiating the most secure variant that they have
in common. Securely composing and implementing the many different versions and features
of TLS has proved to be surprisingly hard, leading to the continued discovery of high-profile
vulnerabilities in the protocol.
A history of vulnerabilities. We identify four kinds of attacks that TLS has traditionally
suffered from. Downgrade attacks enable a network adversary to fool a TLS client and server
into using a weaker variant of the protocol than they would normally use with each other. In
particular, version downgrade attacks were first demonstrated from SSL 3 to SSL 2 [80] and
continue to be exploited in recent attacks like POODLE [66] and DROWN [8]. Cryptographic
vulnerabilities rely on weaknesses in the protocol constructions used by TLS. Recent attacks have
exploited key biases in RC4 [4, 79], padding oracles in MAC-then-Encrypt [5, 66], padding oracles
in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 [8], weak Diffie-Hellman groups [2], and weak hash functions [25]. Protocol
composition flaws appear when multiple modes of the protocol interact in unexpected ways if
enabled in parallel. For example, the renegotiation attack [74] exploits the sequential composition
of two TLS handshakes, the Triple Handshake attack [17] composes three handshakes, and cross-
protocol attacks [64, 80] use one kind of TLS handshake to attack another. Implementation bugs
contribute to the fourth category of attacks on TLS, and are perhaps the hardest to avoid. They
range from memory safety bugs like HeartBleed and coding errors like GotoFail to complex state
machine flaws like SKIP and FREAK [15]. Such bugs can be exploited to bypass all the security
guarantees of TLS, and their prevalence, even in widely-vetted code, indicates the challenges of
implementing TLS securely.
Security proofs. Historically, when an attack is found on TLS, practitioners propose a tempo-
rary fix that is implemented in all mainstream TLS libraries, then a longer-term countermeasure
is incorporated into a protocol extension or in the next version of the protocol. This has led to
a attack-patch-attack cycle that does not provide much assurance in any single version of the
protocol, let alone its implementations.
An attractive alternative would have been to develop security proofs that systematically
demonstrated the absence of large classes of attacks in TLS. However, developing proofs for an
existing standard that was not designed with security models in mind is exceedingly hard [70].
After years of effort, the cryptographic community only recently published proofs for the two
main components of TLS: the record layer that implements authenticated encryption [63, 69], and
the handshake layer that composes negotiation and key-exchange [52, 57]. These proofs required
new security definitions and custom cryptographic assumptions, and even so, they apply only
to abstract models of certain modes of the protocol. For example, the proofs do not account
for low-level details of message formats, downgrade attacks, or composition flaws. Since such
cryptographic proofs are typically carried out by hand, extending the proofs to cover all these
details would require a prohibitive amount of work, and the resulting large proofs themselves
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would need to be carefully checked.
A different approach taken by the protocol verification community is to symbolically analyze
cryptographic protocols using simpler, stronger assumptions on the underlying cryptography,
commonly referred to as the Dolev-Yao model [43]. Such methods are easy to automate and
can tackle large protocols like TLS in all their gory detail, and even aspects of TLS implemen-
tations [35, 20]. Symbolic protocol analyzers are better at finding attacks, but since they treat
cryptographic constructions as perfect black boxes, they provide weaker security guarantees than
classic cryptographic proofs that account for probabilistic and computational attacks.
The most advanced example of mechanized verification for TLS is the ongoing miTLS
project [23], which uses dependent types to prove both the symbolic and cryptographic secu-
rity of a TLS implementation that supports TLS 1.0-1.2, multiple key exchanges and encryption
modes, session resumption, and renegotiation. This effort has uncovered weaknesses in both
the TLS 1.2 standard [17] and its other implementations [15], and the proof is currently being
extended towards TLS 1.3.
Towards Verified Security for TLS 1.3. In 2014, the TLS working group at the IETF
commenced work on TLS 1.3, with the goal of designing a faster protocol inspired by the success
of Google’s QUIC protocol [50]. Learning from the pitfalls of TLS 1.2, the working group
invited the research community to contribute to the design of the protocol and help analyze its
security even before the standard is published. A number of researchers, including the authors
of this paper, responded by developing new security models and cryptographic proofs for various
draft versions, and using their analyses to propose protocol changes. Cryptographic proofs were
developed for Draft-5 [44], Draft-9 [58], and Draft-10 [61], which justified the core design of the
protocol. A detailed symbolic model in Tamarin was developed for Draft-10 [39]. Other works
studied specific aspects of TLS 1.3, such as key confirmation [46], client authentication [56], and
downgrade resilience [16].
Some of these analyses also found attacks. The Tamarin analysis [39] uncovered a poten-
tial attack on the composition of pre-shared keys and certificate-based authentication, and this
attack was prevented in Draft-11. A version downgrade attack was found in Draft-12 and its
countermeasure in Draft-13 was proved secure [16]. A cross-protocol attack on RSA signatures
was described in [53]. Even in this paper, we describe two vulnerabilities in 0-RTT client au-
thentication that we discovered and reported, which influenced the subsequent designs of Draft-7
and -13.
After 18 drafts, TLS 1.3 is entering the final phase of standardization. Although many of its
design decisions have now been vetted by multiple security analyses, several unanswered questions
remain. First, the protocol has continued to evolve rapidly with every draft version, so many of
the cryptographic proofs cited above are already obsolete and do not apply to Draft-18. Since
many of these are manual proofs, it is not easy to update them and check all the proof steps.
Second, none of these symbolic or cryptographic analyses, with the exception of [16], consider
the composition of TLS 1.3 with legacy versions like TLS 1.2. Hence, they do not account for
attacks like [53] that exploit weak legacy crypto in TLS 1.2 to break the modern cryptographic
constructions of TLS 1.3. Third, none of these works addresses TLS 1.3 implementations. In
this paper, we seek to cover these gaps with a new comprehensive analysis of TLS 1.3 Draft-18.
Our Contributions. We propose a methodology for developing mechanically verified models
of TLS 1.3 alongside a high-assurance reference implementation of the protocol.
We present symbolic protocol models for TLS 1.3 written in ProVerif [31]. They incorporate
a novel security model (described in §2) that accounts for all recent attacks on TLS, including
those relying on weak cryptographic algorithms. In §3-5, we use ProVerif to evaluate various
modes and drafts of TLS 1.3 culminating in the first symbolic analysis of Draft-18 and the first
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composite analysis of TLS 1.3+1.2. Our analyses uncover known and new vulnerabilities that
influenced the final design of Draft-18. Some of the features we study no longer appear in the
protocol, but our analysis is still useful for posterity, to warn protocol designers and developers
who may be tempted to reintroduce these problematic features in the future.
In §6, we develop the first machine-checked cryptographic proof for TLS 1.3 using the veri-
fication tool CryptoVerif [27]. Our proof reduces the security of TLS 1.3 Draft-18 to standard
cryptographic assumptions over its primitives. In contrast to manual proofs, our CryptoVerif
script can be more easily updated from draft-to-draft, and as the protocol evolves.
Our ProVerif and CryptoVerif models capture the protocol core of TLS 1.3, but they elide
many implementation details such as the protocol API and state machine. To demonstrate that
our security results apply to carefully-written implementations of TLS 1.3, we present RefTLS
(§7), the first reference implementation of TLS 1.0-1.3 whose core protocol code has been formally
analyzed for security. RefTLS is written in Flow, a statically typed variant of JavaScript, and is
structured so that all its protocol code is isolated in a single module that can be automatically
translated to ProVerif and symbolically analyzed against our rich threat model.
Our models and code are available at:
https://github.com/inria-prosecco/reftls
2 A Security Model for TLS
Client C Server S
Knows (skC , pkC), psk Knows (skS , pkS), psk
Negotiation (offerC ,modeS)
Authenticated Key Exchange (cid , kc, ks, psk ′)
New client session:
C = C ] cid 7→ (offerC ,modeS ,




S = S ] cid 7→ (offerC ,modeS ,
pkC , pkS , psk ,
kc, ks, psk
′)
Authenticated Encryption (enckc(m0), encks(m1), . . .)
Application Data Stream:
C
cid←→ S : m0,m1, . . .
Application Data Stream:
C
cid←→ S : m0,m1, . . .
Figure 1: TLS Protocol Structure: Negotiation, then Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE),
then Authenticated Encryption (AE) for application data streams. The server chooses modeS ,
including the protocol version, the AKE mode, and the AE algorithm. In TLS 1.2, the AKE
may use RSA, (EC)DHE, PSK, etc. and AE may use AES-CBC MAC-Encode-Encrypt, RC4,
or AES-GCM. In TLS 1.3, the AKE may use (EC)-DHE, PSK, or PSK-(EC)DHE, and AE may
use AES-GCM, AES-CCM, or ChaCha20-Poly1305. The use of one or more of (pkC , pkS , psk)
in the session depends on the AKE mode.
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Figure 1 depicts the progression of a typical TLS connection. Since a client and server may
support different sets of features, they first negotiate a protocol mode that they have in common.
In TLS, the client C makes an offerC and the server chooses its preferred modeS , which includes
the protocol version, the key exchange protocol, the authenticated encryption scheme, the Diffie-
Hellman group (if applicable), and the signature and hash algorithms.
Then, C and S execute the negotiated authenticated key exchange protocol (e.g. Ephemeral
Elliptic-Curve Diffie Hellman), which may use some combination of the long-term keys (e.g.
public/private key pairs, symmetric pre-shared keys) known to the client and server. The key
exchange ends by computing fresh symmetric keys (kc, ks) for a new session (with identifier cid)
between C and S, and potentially a new pre-shared key (psk ′) that can be used to authenticate
future connections between them.
In TLS, the negotiation and key exchange phases are together called the handshake protocol.
Once the handshake is complete, C and S can start exchanging application data, protected by
an authenticated encryption scheme (e.g. AES-GCM) with the session keys (kc, ks). The TLS
protocol layer that handles authenticated encryption for application data is called the record
protocol.
Security Goals for TLS. Each phase of a TLS connection has its own correctness and security
goals. For example, during negotiation, the server must choose a modeS that is consistent with
the client’s offerC ; the key exchange must produce a secret session key, and so on. Although these
intermediate security goals are important building blocks towards the security of the full TLS
protocol, they are less meaningful to applications that typically use TLS via a TCP-socket-like
API and are unaware of the protocol’s internal structure. Consequently, we state the security
goals of TLS from the viewpoint of the application, in terms of messages it sends and receives
over a protocol session.
All goals are for messages between honest and authenticated clients and servers, that is, for
those whose long-term keys (skC , skS , psk) are unknown to the attacker. If only the server is
authenticated, then the goals are stated solely from the viewpoint of the client, since the server
does not know whether it is talking to an honest client or the attacker.
Secrecy: If an application data message m is sent over a session cid between an honest client
C and honest server S, then this message is kept confidential from an attacker who cannot
break the cryptographic constructions used in the session cid .
Forward Secrecy: Secrecy (above) holds even if the long-term keys of the client and server
(skC , pkC , psk) are given to the adversary after the session cid has been completed and the
session keys kc, ks are deleted by C and S.
Authentication: If an application data message m is received over a session cid from an honest
and authenticated peer, then the peer must have sent the same application data m in a
matching session (with the same parameters cid , offerC ,modeS , pkC , pkS , psk , kc, ks, psk
′).
Replay Prevention: Any application data m sent over a session cid may be accepted at most
once by the peer.
Unique Channel Identifier: If a client session and a server session have the same identifier
cid , then all other parameters in these sessions must match (same cid , offerC ,modeS , pkC ,
pkS , psk , kc, ks, psk
′).
These security goals encompass most of the standard security goals for secure channel proto-
cols such as TLS. For example, secrecy for application data implicitly requires that the authenti-
cated key exchange must generate secret keys. Authentication incorporates the requirement that
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the client and server must have matching sessions, and in particular, that they agree on each
others’ identities as well as the inputs and outputs of negotiation. Hence, it prohibits client and
server impersonation, and man-in-the-middle downgrade attacks.
The requirement for a unique channel identifier is a bit more unusual, but it allows multiple
TLS sessions to be securely composed, for example via session resumption or renegotiation,
without exposing them to credential forwarding attacks like Triple Handshake [17]. The channel
identifier could itself be a session key or a value generated from it, but is more usually a public
value that is derived from session data contributed by both the client and server [19].
Symbolic vs. Computational Models. Before we can model and verify TLS 1.3 against
the security goals given above, we need to specify our protocol execution model. There are two
different styles in which protocols have classically been modeled, and in this paper, we employ
both of them. Symbolic models were developed by the security protocol verification community
for ease of automated analysis. Cryptographers, on the other hand, prefer to use computational
models and do their proofs by hand. A full comparison between these styles is beyond the scope
of this paper (see e.g. [30]); here we briefly outline their differences in terms of the two tools we
will use.
ProVerif [28, 31] analyzes symbolic protocol models, whereas CryptoVerif [27] verifies com-
putational models. The input languages of both tools are similar. For each protocol role (e.g.
client or server) we write a process that can send and receive messages over public channels,
trigger security events, and store messages in persistent databases.
In ProVerif, messages are modeled as abstract terms. Processes can generate new nonces and
keys, which are treated as atomic opaque terms that are fresh and unguessable. Functions map
terms to terms. For example, encryption constructs a complex term from its arguments (key
and plaintext) that can only be deconstructed by decryption (with the same key). The attacker
is an arbitrary ProVerif process running in parallel with the protocol, which can read and write
messages on public channels, and can manipulate them symbolically.
In CryptoVerif, messages are concrete bitstrings. Freshly generated nonces and keys are
randomly sampled bitstrings that the attacker can guess with some probability (depending on
their length). Encryption and decryption are functions on bitstrings to which we may asso-
ciate standard cryptographic assumptions such as IND-CCA. The attacker is a probabilistic
polynomial-time CryptoVerif process running in parallel.
Authentication goals in both ProVerif and CryptoVerif are written as correspondences be-
tween events: for example, if the client triggers a certain event, then the server must have trig-
gered a matching event in the past. Secrecy is treated differently in the two tools; in ProVerif, we
typically ask whether the attacker can compute a secret, whereas in CryptoVerif, we ask whether
it can distinguish a secret from a random bitstring.
The analysis techniques employed by the two tools are quite different. ProVerif searches
for a protocol trace that violates the security goal, whereas CryptoVerif tries to construct a
cryptographic proof that the protocol is equivalent (with high probability) to a trivially secure
protocol. ProVerif is a push-button tool that may return that the security goal is true in the
symbolic model, or that the goal is false with a counterexample, or that it is unable to conclude,
or may fail to terminate. CryptoVerif is semi-automated, it can search for proofs but requires
human guidance for non-trivial protocols.
We use both ProVerif and CryptoVerif for their complementary strengths. CryptoVerif can
prove stronger security properties of the protocol under precise cryptographic assumptions, but
the proofs require more work. ProVerif can quickly analyze large protocols to automatically find
attacks, but a positive result does not immediately provide a cryptographic proof of security.
Deriving sound cryptographic proofs using symbolic analysis is still an open problem for real-
world protocols [38].
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A Realistic Threat Model for TLS. We seek to analyze TLS 1.3 for the above security goals
against a rich threat model that includes both classic protocol adversaries as well as new ones that
apply specifically to multi-mode protocols like TLS. In particular, we model recent downgrade
attacks on TLS by allowing the use of weak cryptographic algorithms in older versions of TLS.
In our analyses, the attacker can use any of the following attack vectors to disrupt the protocol.
• Network Adversary: As usual, we assume that the attacker can intercept, modify, and send
all messages sent on public network channels.
• Compromised Principals: The attacker can compromise any client or server principal P
by asking for its long-term secrets, such as its private key (skP ) or pre-shared key (psk).
We do not restrict which principals can be compromised, but whenever such a compromise
occurs, we mark it with a security event: Compromised(pkP) or CompromisedPSK(psk). If
the compromise event occurs after a session is complete, we issue a different security event:
PostSessionCompromise(cid, pkP).
• Weak Long-term Keys: If the client or server has a weak key that the attacker may be
able to break with sufficient computation, we treat such keys the same way as compromised
keys and we issue a more general event:WeakOrCompromised(pkP). This conservative model of
weak keys is enough to uncover attacks like FREAK [15] that rely on the use of 512-bit RSA
keys by TLS servers.
• RSA Decryption Oracles: TLS versions up to 1.2 use RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption, which
is known to be vulnerable to a form of padding oracle attack on decryption originally discovered
by Bleichenbacher [32]. Although countermeasures to this attack have been incorporated into
TLS, they remains hard to implement securely [65] resulting in continued attacks such as
DROWN [8]. Furthermore, such padding oracles can sometimes even be converted to signature
oracles for the corresponding private key [53].
We assume that any TLS server (at any version) that enables RSA decryption may poten-
tially be vulnerable to such attacks. We distinguish between two kinds of RSA key ex-
change: RSA(StrongRSADecryption) and RSA(WeakRSADecryption). In any session, if the
server chooses the latter, we provide the attacker with a decryption and signature oracle for
that private key.
• Weak Diffie-Hellman Groups: To account for attacks like Logjam [2], we allow servers to
choose between strong and weak Diffie-Hellman groups (or elliptic curves), and mark the cor-
responding key exchange mode as DHE(StrongDH) or DHE(WeakDH). We conservatively assume
that weak groups have size 1, so all Diffie-Hellman exponentiations in these groups return the
same distinguished element BadElement.
Even strong Diffie-Hellman groups typically have small subgroups that should be avoided.
We model these subgroups by allowing a weak subgroup (of size 1) even within a strong
group. A malicious client or server may choose BadElement as its public value, and then all
exponentiations with this element as the base will also return BadElement. To avoid generating
keys in this subgroup, clients and servers must validate the received public value.
• Weak Hash Functions: TLS uses hash functions for key derivation, HMAC, and for signa-
tures. Versions up to TLS 1.2 use various combinations of MD5 and SHA-1, both of which are
considered weak today, leading to exploitable attacks on TLS such as SLOTH [25].
We model both strong and weak hash functions, and the client and server get to negotiate
which function they will use in signatures. Strong hash functions are treated as one-way
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functions in our symbolic model, whereas weak hash functions are treated as point functions
that map all inputs to a constant value: Collision. Hence, in our model, it is trivial for the
attacker to find collisions as well as second preimages for weak hash functions.
• Weak Authenticated Encryption: To model recent attacks on RC4 [4, 79] and
TripleDES [24], we allow both weak and strong authenticated encryption schemes. For data
encrypted with a weak scheme, irrespective of the key, we provide the adversary with a de-
cryption oracle.
A number of attacks on the TLS Record protocol stem from its use of a MAC-Encode-Encrypt
construction for CBC-mode ciphersuites. This construction is known to be vulnerable to
padding oracle attacks such as POODLE [66] and Lucky13 [5], and countermeasures have
proved hard to implement correctly [3]. We model such attacks using a leaky decryption
function. Whenever a client or server decrypts a message with this function, the function
returns the right result but also leaks the plaintext to the adversary.
The series of threats described above comprise our conservative threat model for TLS 1.3, and
incorporates entire classes of attacks that have been shown to be effective against older versions
of the protocol, including Triple Handshake, POODLE, Lucky 13, RC4 NOMORE, FREAK,
Logjam, SLOTH, DROWN. In most cases, we assume strictly stronger adversaries than have
been demonstrated in practice, but since attacks only get better over time, our model seeks
to be defensive against future attacks. It is worth noting that, even though TLS 1.3 does not
itself support any weak ciphers, TLS 1.3 clients and servers will need to support legacy protocol
versions for backwards compatibility. Our model enables a fine-grained analysis of vulnerabilities:
we can ask whether TLS 1.3 connections between a client and a server are secure even if TLS 1.2
connections between them are broken.
Modeling the Threat Model in ProVerif. We encode our threat model as a generic ProVerif
crypto library that can be used with any protocol. For each cryptographic primitive, our library
contains constructors and destructors, that not only model the ideal behavior of strong crypto-
graphic algorithms but also incorporates the possibility that honest protocol participants may
support weak cryptographic algorithms.
Figure 2 displays our ProVerif model for Diffie-Hellman. We start by defining a type for
groups; for simplicity, we only allow two groups (one strong, one weak). We then define a
type for group elements and identify two distinguished elements that occur in every group,
a basepoint G, and an element BadElement that belongs to a trivial subgroup. The function
dh_ideal exponentiates a (public) element with a (secret) scalar; the equation describing its
behavior encode the expected, ideal behaviour of Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. However, our
protocol processes do not use dh_ideal; instead they call dh_exp which is parameterized by
the group, and behaves differently depending on the strength of the group, and the validity of
the element. If the group is strong and the element is a valid member of the group (that is, it
does not belong to a small subgroup), then dh_exp behaves like dh_ideal. In all other cases,
the result of dh_exp is the trivial element BadElement; that is, it is known to the attacker. The
final letfun in the figure shows how Diffie-Hellman keys are generated. We note that our model
of weak groups and bad elements is conservative and simplistic; we aim to verify the security of
protocols that use strong groups, even if weak groups are catastrophically broken.
Similarly to our model of Diffie-Hellman, we write models for AEAD, hash functions, HMAC,
RSA signatures and encryption. Using these primitives, all the cryptographic constructions of
TLS 1.2 and 1.3 are built as derived functions. To understand our security theorems, it is
important for the analyst to carefully inspect our cryptographic library and agree with its implicit
and explicit assumptions.
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type group.
const StrongDH: group [data].
const WeakDH: group [data].
type element.
fun e2b(element): bitstring [data].
const BadElement: element [data].
const G: element [data].
fun dh_ideal(element,bitstring):element.
equation forall x:bitstring, y:bitstring;
dh_ideal(dh_ideal(G,x),y) = dh_ideal(dh_ideal(G,y),x).
fun dh_exp(group,element,bitstring):element
reduc forall g:group, e:element, x:bitstring;
dh_exp(WeakDH,e,x) = BadElement
otherwise forall g:group, e:element, x:bitstring;
dh_exp(StrongDH,BadElement,x) = BadElement




let gx = dh_exp(g,G,x) in
(x,gx).
Figure 2: A Model of Diffie-Hellman in ProVerif that allows the weak groups and allows elements
in small subgroups.
Modeling and Verifying TLS 1.2 in ProVerif. To evaluate our threat model, and in
preparation for our analysis of TLS 1.3, we symbolically analyze a model of TLS 1.2 using
ProVerif. Our model includes TLS 1.2 clients and servers that support both RSA and Diffie-
Hellman key exchanges, and are willing to use both weak and strong cryptography. We assume
that clients are unauthenticated.
For illustration, Figure 3 shows the Diffie-Hellman handshake followed by the exchange of
two application data fragments m0,m1. The handshake has four flights; the client sends a
ClientHello offering a set of algorithms; the server responds with a ServerHello that chooses
specific connection parameters, and then sends its certificate and (signed) key exchange message.
The client responds with its own key exchange message and a Finished message with a MAC of
the handshake using the connection master secret ms. The server completes the handshake by
sending its own Finished message. These last two messages are meant to guarantee agreement
on the keys and the handshake transcript, and they already encrypted with the new connection
keys k. Once both have verified each others’ finished messages, the application on top of TLS
can start sending application data in the two directions.
We write ProVerif processes for TLS 1.2 clients and servers that exchange messages ac-
cording to the protocol flow described above, and issue a sequence of events–ClientOffers,
ServerChooses, ClientFinished, ServerFinished, ClientSends, ServerReceives–indicating
their progress through the protocol. We then compose these processes with our threat model
and add queries for message authenticity and secrecy.
For example, a secrecy query may ask whether the attacker can learn some application data
message (say m0) sent by the client over a particular connection (identified by the client and
server random values and the server’s public key):
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Client C Server S
Knows skC Knows skS , kt
ClientHello(nC , TLS1.2, {DHE, RSA}, {AES-GCM, RC4})
ServerHello(nS , TLS1.2, DHE, AES-GCM)
KeyExchange(certS , signskS (G, gy))
log1 log1
KeyExchange(gx, [certC , signskS (log1)])
Computes:
(ms, k) = kdf(gxy, nC‖nS)
Computes:







anon↔ S : m0,m1
Conversation:
anon↔ S : m0,m1
Figure 3: TLS 1.2 (EC)DHE handshake, no client authentication.
query cr:random, sr:random, p:pubkey;
attacker(m_0(cr,sr,p)).
When we run ProVerif for this query, it finds a counter-example: the attacker can learn m if
it can compromise server’s private key (WeakOrCompromised(pkS)). To check whether this is the
only case in which m is leaked, we refine the secrecy query and run ProVerif again. ProVerif again
finds a counter-example: the attacker can learn m if the server chooses a weak Diffie-Hellman
group (ServerChoosesKex(DHE(WeakDH))). In this way, we keep refining our queries until we
obtain the strongest secrecy query that holds for our TLS 1.2 model, that is, until we stop
finding attacks:











This query is our main symbolic secrecy result for TLS 1.2; we similarly derive our strongest
symbolic authenticaiton query. These two goals can be read as follows:
• TLS 1.2 (Forward) Secrecy: A message m sent by an honest client in a session cid to a
server S cannot be known to the adversary unless one of the following conditions holds:
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(1) the server’s public key is weak or compromised, or
(2) the session uses weak authenticated encryption, or
(3) the session uses a weak Diffie-Hellman group, or
(4) the server uses weak RSA decryption with the same public key (in this or any other session),
or
(5) the server uses a weak hash function for signing with the same public key (in any session),
or
(6) the session uses an RSA key exchange and the server’s public key was compromised after
the session was complete.
• TLS 1.2 Authenticity & Replay Protection: Every message m accepted by an honest
client in a session cid with some server S corresponds to a unique message sent by S on a
matching session, unless one of the conditions (1)-(5) above holds.
Both these queries are verified by ProVerif in a few seconds. All the disjuncts (1)-(6) in these
queries are necessary, removing any of them results in a counterexample discovered by ProVerif,
corresponding to some well-known attack on badly configured TLS 1.2 connections.
Interestingly, the conditions (2), (3) are session specific, that is, only the sessions where these
weak constructions are used are affected. In contrast, (4) and (5) indicate that the use of weak
RSA decryption or a weak hash function in any session affects all other sessions that use the
same server public key. As we shall see, this has an impact on the security of TLS 1.3 when
it is composed with TLS 1.2. (6) encodes our forward secrecy goal, which does not hold for
connections that use RSA key exchange, but holds for (EC)DHE.
We also verify our TLS 1.2 model for more advanced properties, such as unique channel
identifiers; we find that using the connection key cid = kc does not yield a unique identifier.
ProVerif finds a variant of the Triple Handshake attack, unless we implement the recommended
countermeasure [71].
Verification Effort. The work of verifying TLS 1.2 can be divided into three tasks. We first
modeled the threat model as a 400 line ProVerif library, but this library can now be reused for
other protocols, including TLS 1.3. We then modeled the TLS 1.2 protocol in about 200 lines of
ProVerif. Finally, we wrote about 50 lines of queries, both to validate our model (e.g. checking
that the protocol completes in the absence of an attacker) and to prove our desired security
goals. Most of the effort is in formalizing, refining, and discovering the right security queries.
Although ProVerif is fully automated, verification gets more expensive as the protocol grows
more complex. So, as we extend our models to cover multiple modes of TLS 1.3 composed with
TLS 1.2, we sometimes need to simplify or restructure our models to aid verification.
3 TLS 1.3 1-RTT: Simpler, Faster Handshakes
In its simplest form, TLS 1.3 consists of a Diffie-Hellman handshake, typically using an elliptic
curve, followed by application data encryption using an AEAD scheme like AES-GCM. The
essential structure of 1-RTT has remained stable since early drafts of TLS 1.3. It departs
from the TLS 1.2 handshake in two ways. First, the key exchange is executed alongside the
negotiation protocol so the client can start sending application data along with its second flight
of messages (after one round-trip, hence 1-RTT), unlike TLS 1.2 where the client had to wait for
two message flights from the server. Second, TLS 1.3 eliminates a number of problematic features
in TLS 1.2; it removes RSA key transport, weak encryption schemes (RC4, TripleDES, AES-
CBC), and renegotiation; it requires group negotiation with strong standardized Diffie-Hellman
groups, and it systematically binds session keys to the handshake log to prevent attacks like the
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Client C Server S
Long-term Keys: (skC , pkC) Long-term Keys: (skS , pkS)
ClientHello(nC , offerC [(G, g
x), G′])
RetryRequest(G′)
Generates x′ and computes:
es = kdf0
Generates y and computes:
es = kdf0





modeS = (TLS1.3, DHE(G′),H(), enc())
log1 log1
ServerHello(nS ,modeS [G′, gy])
Computes:
hs = kdfhs(es, g
x′y)






s = kdfms(hs, log1)
Computes:
hs = kdfhs(es, g
x′y)






s = kdfms(hs, log1)
enck
h
s (Extensions(. . .))
enck
h
















kc, ks, ems = kdfk(ms, log4)
Computes:
















psk ′ = kdfpsk (ms, log7)
cid = ems or psk ′ or H(log7)
Computes:
psk ′ = kdfpsk (ms, log7)
cid = ems or psk ′ or H(log7)
New client session:
C = C ] cid 7→ (offerC ,modeS ,
pkC , pkS ,
kc, ks, ems, psk
′)
New server session:
S = S ] cid 7→ (offerC ,modeS ,
pkC , pkS ,






cid←→ S : m1,m2, . . .
Application Data Stream:
C
cid←→ S : m1,m2, . . .
Figure 4: TLS 1.3 Draft-18 1-RTT Protocol. The protocol uses an (EC)DHE key exchange with
server certificate authentication: client authentication and the RetryRequest negotiation steps
are optional.
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Key Derivation Functions:
hkdf-extract(k, s) = HMAC-Hk(s)
hkdf-expand-label1(s, l, h) = HMAC-H
s(lenH()‖“TLS 1.3, ”‖l‖h‖0x01)
derive-secret(s, l,m) = hkdf-expand-label1(s, l,H(m))
1-RTT Key Schedule:
kdf0 = hkdf-extract(0lenH() , 0lenH())
kdfhs(es, e) = hkdf-extract(es, e)









ms = hkdf-extract(hs, 0lenH())
htsc = derive-secret(hs, htsc, log1)
htss = derive-secret(hs, htss, log1)
khc = hkdf-expand-label(htsc, key, “”)
kmc = hkdf-expand-label(htsc, finished, “”)
khs = hkdf-expand-label(htss, key, “”)
kms = hkdf-expand-label(htss, finished, “”)
kdfk(ms, log4) = kc, ks, ems where
atsc = derive-secret(ms, atsc, log4)
atss = derive-secret(ms, atss, log4)
ems = derive-secret(ms, ems, log4)
kc = hkdf-expand-label(atsc, key, “”)
ks = hkdf-expand-label(atss, key, “”)
kdfpsk (ms, log7) = psk
′ where
psk ′ = derive-secret(ms, rms, log7)
PSK-based Key Schedule:
kdfes(psk) = es, k
b where
es = hkdf-extract(0lenH() , psk)
kb = derive-secret(es, pbk, “”)
kdf0RTT (es, log1) = kc where
etsc = derive-secret(es, etsc, log1)
kc = hkdf-expand-label(etsc, key, “”)
Figure 5: TLS 1.3 Draft-18 Key Schedule. The hash function H() is typically SHA-256, which
has length lenH() = 32 bytes.
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Triple Handshake. In this section, we detail the protocol flow, we model it in ProVerif, and we
analyze it alongside TLS 1.2 in the security model of §2.
1-RTT Protocol Flow. A typical 1-RTT connection in Draft 18 proceeds as shown in Figure 4.
The first four messages form the negotiation phase. The client sends a ClientHello message
containing a nonce nC and an offerC that lists the versions, groups, hash functions, and authen-
ticated encryption algorithms that it supports. For each group G that the client supports, it may
include a Diffie-Hellman key share gx. On receiving this message, the server chooses a modeS
that fixes the version, group, and all other session parameters. Typically, the server chooses a
group G for which the client already provided a public value, and so it can send its ServerHello
containing a nonce nS , modeS and gy to the client. If none of the client’s groups are acceptable,
the server may ask the client (via RetryRequest) to resend the client hello with a key share gx
′
for the server’s preferred group G′. (In this case, the handshake requires two round trips.)
Once the client receives the ServerHello, the negotiation is complete and both participants
derive handshake encryption keys from gx
′y, one in each direction (khc , khs ), with which they
encrypt all subsequent handshake messages. The client and server also generate two MAC keys
(kmc , kms ) for use in the Finished messages described below. The server then sends a flight of up
to 5 encrypted messages: Extensions contains any protocol extensions that were not sent in the
ServerHello; CertRequest contains an optional request for a client certificate; Certificate
contains the server’s X.509 public-key certificate; CertVerify contains a signature with server’s
private key skS over the log of the transcript so far (log2); Finished contains a MAC with kms
over the current log (log3). Then the server computes the 1-RTT traffic keys kc, ks and may
immediately start using ks to encrypt application data to the client.
Upon receiving the server’s encrypted handshake flight, the client verifies the certificate,
the signature, and the MAC, and if all verifications succeed, the client sends its own second
flight consisting of an optional certificate Certificate and signature CertVerify, followed by
a mandatory Finished with a MAC over the full handshake log. Then the client starts sending
its own application data encrypted under kc. Once the server receives the client’s second flight,
we consider the handshake complete and put all the session parameters into the local session
databases at both client and server (C, S).
In addition to the traffic keys for the current session, the 1-RTT handshake generates two
extra keys: ems is an exporter master secret that may be used by the application to bind
authentication credentials to the TLS channel; psk ′ is a resumption master secret that may be
used as a pre-shared key in future TLS connections between C and S.
The derivation of keys in the protocol follows a linear key schedule, as depicted on the right
of Figure 4. The first version of this key schedule was inspired by OPTLS [58] and introduced
into TLS 1.3 in Draft-7. The key idea in this design is to accumulate key material and handshake
context into the derived keys using a series of HKDF invocations as the protocol progresses. For
example, in connections that use pre-shared keys (see §5), the key schedule begins by deriving
es from psk , but after the ServerHello, we add in gx
′y to obtain the handshake secret hs.
Whenever we extract encryption keys, we mix in the current handshake log, in order to avoid
key synchronization attacks like the Triple Handshake.
Since its introduction in Draft-7, the key schedule has undergone many changes, with a
significant round of simplifications in Draft-13. Since all previously published analyses of 1-RTT
predate Draft-13, this leaves open the question whether the current Draft-18 1-RTT protocol is
still secure.
Modeling 1-RTT in ProVerif. We write client and server processes in ProVerif that implement
the message sequence and key schedule of Figure 4.
Our models are abstract with respect to the message formats, treating each message (e.g.
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ClientHello(· · · )) as a symbolic constructor, with message parsing modeled as a pattern-match
with this constructor. This means that our analysis assumes that message serialization and
parsing is correct; it won’t find any attacks that rely on parsing ambiguities or bugs. This
abstract treatment of protocol messages is typical of symbolic models; the same approach is
taken by Tamarin [39]. In contrast, miTLS [23] includes a fully verified parser for TLS messages.
The key schedule is written as a sequence of ProVerif functions built using an HMAC function,
hmac(H, m), which takes a hash function H as argument and is assumed to be a one-way function
as long as H = StrongHash. All other cryptographic functions are modeled as described in §2,
with both strong and weak variants.
Persistent state is encoded using tables. To model principals and their long-term keys, we use
a global private table that maps principals (A) to their key pairs ((skA, pkA)). To begin with,
the adversary does not know any of the private keys in this table, but it can compromise any
principal and obtain her private key. As described in §2, this compromise is recorded in ProVerif
by an event WeakOrCompromised(pkA).
As the client and server proceed through the handshake they record security events indicating
their progress. We treat the negotiation logic abstractly; the adversary gets to choose offerC and
modeS , and we record these choices as events (ClientOffers, ServerChooses) at the client and
server. When the handshake is complete, the client and server issue events ServerFinished,
ClientFinished, and store their newly established sessions in two private tables clientSession
and serverSession (corresponding to C and S). These tables are used by the record layer to
retrieve the traffic keys kc, ks for authenticated encryption. Whenever the client or server sends
or receives an application data message, it issues further events (ClientSends, ServerReceives,
etc.) We use all these events along with the client and server session tables to state our security
goals.
1-RTT Security Goals. We encode our security goals as ProVerif queries as follows:
• Secrecy for a message, such as m1, is encoded using an auxiliary process that asks the
adversary to guess the value of m1; if the adversary succeeds, the process issues an event
MessageLeaked(cid , m1). We then write a query to ask ProVerif whether this event is reachable.
• Forward Secrecy is encoded using the same query, but we explicitly leak the client and
server’s long-term keys (skC , skS) at the end of the session cid . ProVerif separately analyzes
pre-compromise and post-compromise sessions as different phases; the forward secrecy query
asks that messages sent in the first phase are kept secret even from attackers who learn the
long-term keys in the second phase.
• Authentication for a message m1 received by the server is written as a query that states
that whenever the event ServerReceives(cid , m1) occurs, it must be preceded by three match-
ing events: ServerFinished(cid , . . .), ClientFinished(cid , . . .), and ClientSends(cid , m1),
which means that some honest client must have sent m1 on a matching session. The authen-
tication query for messages received by clients is similar.
• Replay protection is written as a stronger variant of the authentication query that requires
injectivity : each ServerReceives event must correspond to a unique, matching, preceding
ClientSends event.
• Unique Channel Identifiers are verified using another auxiliary process that looks up ses-
sions from the clientSession and serverSession tables and checks that if the cid in both is
the same, then all other parameters match. Otherwise it raises an event, and we ask ProVerif
to prove that this event is not reachable.
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In addition to the above queries, our scripts often include auxiliary queries about session keys
and other session variables. We do not detail all our queries here; instead, we only summarize
the main verification results. When we first ask ProVerif to verify these queries, it fails and
provides counterexamples; for example, client message authentication does not hold if the client
is compromised Compromised(pkC) or unauthenticated in the session. We then refine the query
by adding this failure condition as a disjunct, and run ProVerif again and repeat the process
until the query is proved. Consequently, our final verification results are often stated as a long
series of disjuncts listing the cases where the desired security goal does not hold.
Verifying 1-RTT in Isolation. For our model of Draft-18 1-RTT, ProVerif can prove the
following secrecy query about all messages (m0.5,m1,m2):
• 1-RTT (Forward) Secrecy: Messages m sent in a session between C and S are secret as
long as the private keys of C and S are not revealed before the end of the session, and the
server chooses a modeS with a strong Diffie-Hellman group, a strong hash function, and a
strong authenticated encryption algorithm.
If we further assume that TLS 1.3 clients and servers only support strong algorithms, we can
simplify the above query to show that all messages sent between uncompromised principals are
kept secret. In the rest of this paper, we assume that TLS 1.3 only enables strong algorithms,
but that earlier versions of the protocol may continue to support weak algorithms.
Messages m1 from the client to the server enjoy strong authentication and protection from
replays:
• 1-RTT Authentication (and Replay Prevention): If a message m is accepted by S over
a session with an honest C, then this message corresponds to a unique message sent by the C
over a matching session.
However the authentication guarantee for messages m0.5,m1 received by the client is weaker.
Since the client does not know whether the server sent this data before or after receiving the
client’s second flight, the client and server sessions may disagree about the client’s identity.
Hence, for these messages, we can only verify a weaker property:
• 0.5-RTT Weak Authentication (and Replay Prevention): If a message m is accepted
by C over a session with an honest S, then this message corresponds to a unique message sent
by S over a server session that matches all values in the client session except (possibly) the
client’s public key pkC , the resumption master secret psk
′, and the channel identifier cid .
We note that by allowing the server to send 0.5-RTT data, Draft-18 has weakened the au-
thentication guarantees for all data received by an authenticated client. For example, if a client
requests personal data from the server over a client-authenticated 1-RTT session, a network at-
tacker could delay the client’s second flight (Certificate − Finished) so that when the client
receives the server’s 0.5-RTT data, it thinks that it contains personal data, but the server actually
sent data intended for an anonymous client.
Verifying TLS 1.3 1-RTT composed with TLS 1.2. We combine our model with the
TLS 1.2 model described at the end of §2 so that each client and server supports both versions.
We then ask the same queries as above, but only for sessions where the server chooses TLS 1.3
as the version in modeS . Surprisingly, ProVerif finds two counterexamples.
First, if a server supports WeakRSADecryption with RSA key transport in TLS 1.2, then the
attacker can use the RSA decryption oracle to forge TLS 1.3 server signatures and hence break
our secrecy and authentication goals. This attack found by ProVerif directly corresponds to
the cross-protocol Bleichenbacher attacks described in [53, 8]. It shows that removing RSA key
Inria
Verified Models and Reference Implementations for TLS 1.3 19
transport from TLS 1.3 is not enough, one must disable the use of TLS 1.2 RSA mode on any
server whose certificate may be accepted by a TLS 1.3 client.
Second, if a client or server supports a weak hash function for signatures in TLS 1.2, then
ProVerif shows how the attacker can exploit this weakness to forge TLS 1.3 signatures in our
model, hence breaking our security goals. This attack corresponds to the SLOTH transcript
collision attack on TLS 1.3 signatures described in [25]. To avoid this attack, TLS 1.3 imple-
mentations must disable weak hash functions in all supported versions, not just TLS 1.3.
After disabling these weak algorithms in TLS 1.2, we can indeed prove all our expected
security goals about Draft-18 1-RTT, even when it is composed with TLS 1.2.
We may also ask whether TLS 1.3 clients and servers can be downgraded to TLS 1.2. If
such a version downgrade takes place, we would end up with a TLS 1.2 session, so we need to
state the query in terms of sessions where modeS contains TLS 1.2. ProVerif finds a version
downgrade attack on a TLS 1.3 session, if the client and server support weak Diffie-Hellman
groups in TLS 1.2. This attack closely mirrors the flaw described in [16]. Draft-13 introduced
a countermeasure in response to this attack, and we verify that by adding it to the model, the
downgrade attack disappears.
Although our models of TLS 1.3 and 1.2 are individually verified in a few seconds each,
their composition takes several minutes to analyze. As we add more features and modes to the
protocol, ProVerif takes longer and requires more memory. Our final composite model for all
modes of TLS 1.3+1.2 takes hours on a powerful workstation.
4 0-RTT with Semi-Static Diffie-Hellman
In earlier versions of TLS, the client would have to wait for two round-trips of handshake messages
before sending its request. 1-RTT in TLS 1.3 brings this down to one round trip, but protocols
like QUIC use a "zero-round-trip" (0-RTT) mode, by relying on a semi-static (long-term) Diffie-
Hellman key. This design was adapted for TLS in the OPTLS proposal [58] and incorporated in
Draft-7 (along with a fix we proposed, as described below).
Protocol Flow. The protocol is depicted in Figure 6. Each server maintains a Diffie-Hellman
key pair (s, gs) and publishes a signed server configuration containing gs. As usual, a client
initiates a connection with a ClientHello containing its ephemeral key gx. If a client has
already obtained and cached the server’s certificate and signed configuration (in a prior exchange
for example), then the client computes a shared secret gxs and uses it to derive an initial set of
shared keys which can then immediately be used to send encrypted data. To authenticate its
0-RTT data, the client may optionally send a certificate and a signature over the client’s first
flight.
The server then responds with a ServerHello message that contains a fresh ephemeral public
key gy. Now, the client and server can continue with a regular 1-RTT handshake using the new
shared secret gxy in addition to gxs.
The 0-RTT protocol continued to evolve from Draft-7 to Draft-12, but in Draft-13, it was
removed in favor of a PSK-based 0-RTT mode. Even though Diffie-Hellman-based 0-RTT no
longer exists in Draft-18, we analyze its security in this section, both for posterity and to warn
protocol designers about the problems they should watch our for if they decide to reintroduce
DH-based 0-RTT in a future version of TLS.
Verification with ProVerif. We modeled the protocol in ProVerif and wrote queries to check
whether the 0-RTT data m0 is (forward) secret and authentic. ProVerif is able to prove secrecy
but finds that m0 is not forward secret if the semi-static key s is compromised once the session
is over. ProVerif also finds a Key Compromise Impersonation attack on authentication: if gs is
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ServerHello(nS ,modeS [G, gy])
(Continue 1-RTT Exchange)
New client session:
C = C ] cid 7→ (offerC ,modeS ,




S = S ] cid 7→ (offerC ,modeS ,






cid←→ S : m0,m1, . . .
Application Data Stream:
C
cid←→ S : m0,m1, . . .
Figure 6: DH-based 0-RTT in TLS 1.3 Draft-12, inspired by QUIC and OPTLS.
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compromised, then an attacker can forge 0-RTT messages from C to S. Furthermore, the 0-RTT
flight can be replayed by an attacker and the server will process it multiple times, thinking that
the client has initiated a new connection each time. In addition to these three concerns, which
were documented in Draft-7, ProVerif also finds a new attack, explained below, that breaks
0-RTT authentication if the server’s certificate is not included in the 0-RTT client signature.
Unknown Key Share Attack on DH-based 0-RTT in QUIC, OPTLS, and TLS 1.3.
We observe that in the 0-RTT protocol, the client starts using gs without having any proof that
the server knows s. So a dishonest server M can claim to have the same semi-static key as S by
signing gs under its own key skM . Now, suppose a client connects toM and sends its client hello
and 0-RTT data; M can simply forward this whole flight to S, which may accept it, because the
semi-static keys match. This is an unknown key share (UKS) attack where C thinks it is talking
to M but it is, in fact, connected to S.
In itself, the UKS attack is difficult to exploit, since M does not know gxs and hence cannot
decrypt or tamper with messages between C and S. However, if the client authenticates its 0-RTT
flight with a certificate, then M can forward C’s certificate (and C’s signature) to S, resulting in
a credential forwarding attack, which is much more serious. Suppose C is a browser that has a
page open at websiteM ; from this pageM can trigger any authenticated 0-RTT HTTPS request
m0 to its own server, which then uses the credential forwarding attack to forward the request to
S, who will process m0 as if it came from C. For example, M may send a POST request that
modifies C’s account details at S.
The unknown key share attack described above applies to both QUIC and OPTLS, but
remained undiscovered despite several security analyses of these protocols [45, 62, 58], because
these works did not consider client authentication, and hence did not formulate an authentication
goal that exposed the flaw. We informed the authors of QUIC and they acknowledged our attack.
They now recommend that users who need client authentication should not use QUIC, and should
instead move over to TLS 1.3. We also informed the authors of the TLS 1.3 standard, and on our
suggestion, Draft-7 of TLS 1.3 included a countermeasure for this attack: the client signature and
0-RTT key derivation include not just the handshake log but also the cached server certificate.
With this countermeasure in place, ProVerif proves authentication for 0-RTT data.
5 Pre-Shared Keys for Resumption and 0-RTT
Aside from the number of round-trips, the main cryptographic cost of a TLS handshake is the
use of public-key algorithms for signatures and Diffie-Hellman, which are still significantly slower
than symmetric encryption and MACs. So, once a session has already been established between
a client and server, it is tempting to reuse the symmetric session key established in this session
as a pre-shared symmetric key in new connections. This mechanism is called session resumption
in TLS 1.2 and is widely used in HTTPS where a single browser typically has many parallel and
sequential connections to the same website. In TLS 1.2, pre-shared keys (PSKs) are also used
instead of certificates by resource-constrained devices that cannot afford public-key encryption.
TLS 1.3 combines both these use-cases in a single PSK-based handshake mode that combines
resumption, PSK-only handshakes, and 0-RTT.
Protocol Flow. Figure 7 shows how this mode extends the regular 1-RTT handshake; in
our analysis, we only consider PSKs that are established within TLS handshakes, but similar
arguments apply to PSKs that are shared out-of-band. We assume that the client and server
have established a pre-shared key psk in some earlier session. The client has cached psk , but
in order to remain state-less, the server has given the client a ticket containing psk encrypted
under an encryption key kt. As usual, the client sends a ClientHello with its ephemeral key
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Client C Server S
Knows (skC , pkC), (psk , enc
kt(psk)) Knows (skS , pkS), kt
Generates x and computes:




(ClientHello(nC , offerC [G, g
x, enckt(psk)]))
Computes:
k0c = kdf0RTT (es, log1)
Generates y, decrypts psk , and computes:
es, kb = kdfes(psk)




ServerHello(nS ,modeS [G, gy])
(Continue 1-RTT Exchange)
New client session:
C = C ] cid 7→ (offerC ,modeS ,




S = S ] cid 7→ (offerC ,modeS ,







cid←→ S : m0,m1,m2, . . .
Application Data Stream:
C
cid←→ S : m0,m1,m2, . . .
Figure 7: TLS 1.3 Draft-18 PSK-based Resumption and 0-RTT.
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share gx and indicates that it prefers to use the shared PSK psk . To prove its knowledge of psk
and to avoid certain attacks (described below), it also MACs the ClientHello with a binder
key kb derived from the psk . The client can then use psk to already derive an encryption key
for 0-RTT data m0 and start sending data without waiting for the server’s response. When
the server receives the client’s flight, it can choose to accept or reject the offered psk . Even
if it accepts the psk , the server may choose to reject the 0-RTT data, it may choose to skip
certificate-based authentication, and (if it does not care about forward secrecy) it may choose to
skip the Diffie-Hellman exchange altogether. The recommended mode is PSK-DHE, where psk
and gxy are both mixed into the session keys. The server then sends back a ServerHello with
its choice and the protocol proceeds with the appropriate 1-RTT handshake and completes the
session.
Verifying PSK-based Resumption. We first model the PSK-DHE 1-RTT handshake (with-
out certificate authentication) and verify that it still meets our usual security goals:
• PSK-DHE 1-RTT (Forward) Secrecy Any message m sent over a PSK-DHE session in
1-RTT is secret as long as the PSK psk and the ticket encryption key kt are not compromised
until the end of the session.
• PSK-DHE 1-RTT Authentication and Replay Protection Any message m received
over a PSK-DHE session in 1-RTT corresponds to a unique message sent by a peer over a
matching session (notably with the same psk) unless psk or kt are compromised during the
session.
• PSK-DHE 1-RTT Unique Channel Identifier The values psk ′, ems, and H(log7) gener-
ated in a DHE or PSK-DHE session are all unique channel identifiers.
Notably, data sent over PSK-DHE is forward secret even if the server’s long term ticket
encryption key kt is compromised after the session. In contrast, pure PSK handshakes do not
provide this forward secrecy.
The authentication guarantee requires that the client and server must agree on the value of
the PSK psk , and if this PSK was established in a prior session, then the unique channel identifier
property says that the client and server must transitively agree on the prior session as well. An
earlier analysis of Draft-10 in Tamarin [39] found a violation of the authentication goal because
the 1-RTT client signature in Draft-10 did not include the server’s Finished or any other value
that was bound to the PSK. This flaw was fixed in Draft-11 and hence we are able to prove
authentication for Draft-18.
Verifying PSK-based 0-RTT. We extend our model with the 0-RTT exchange and verify that
m0 is authentic and secret. The strongest queries that ProVerif can prove are the following:
• PSK-based 0-RTT (Forward) Secrecy A message m0 sent from C to S in a 0-RTT flight
is secret as long as psk and kt are never compromised.
• PSK-based 0-RTT Authentication A message m0 received by S from C in a 0-RTT flight
corresponds to some message sent by C with a matching ClientHello and matching psk ,
unless the psk or kt are compromised.
In other words, PSK-based 0-RTT data is not forward secret and is vulnerable to replay
attacks. As can be expected, it provides a symmetric authentication property: since both C and
S know the psk , if either of them is compromised, the attacker can forge 0-RTT messages.
An Attack on 0-RTT Client Authentication. Up to Draft-12, the client could authenticate
its 0-RTT data with a client certificate in addition to the PSK. This served the following use
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case: suppose a client and server establish an initial 1-RTT session (that outputs psk ′) where
the client is unauthenticated. Some time later, the server asks the client to authenticate itself,
and so they perform a PSK-DHE handshake (using psk ′) with client authentication. The use of
psk ′ ensures continuity between the two sessions. In the new session, the client wants to start
sending messages immediately, and so it would like to use client authentication in 0-RTT.
To be consistent with Draft-12, suppose we remove the outer binder MAC (using kb) on the
ClientHello in Figure 7, and we allow client authentication in 0-RTT. Then, if we model this
protocol in ProVerif and ask the 0-RTT authentication query again, ProVerif finds a credential
forwarding attack, explained next.
Suppose a client C shares psk with a malicious server M , and M shares a different psk ′ with
an honest server S. If C sends an authenticated 0-RTT flight (certificate, signature, data m0)
to M , M can decrypt this flight using psk , re-encrypt it using psk ′, and forward the flight to S.
S will accept the authenticated data m0 from C as intended for itself, whereas C intended to
send it only to M . In many HTTPS scenarios, as discussed in §4, M may be able to control the
contents of this data, so this attack allows M to send arbitrary requests authenticated by C to
S.
This attack was not discovered in previous analyses of TLS 1.3 since many of them did not
consider client authentication; the prior Tamarin analysis [39] found a similar attack on 1-RTT
client authentication but did not consider 0-RTT client authentication. The attacks described
here and in [39] belong to a general class of compound authentication vulnerabilities that appear
in protocols that compose multiple authentication credentials [19]. In this case, the composition
of interest is between PSK and certificate-based authentication. We found a similar attack on
1-RTT server authentication in pure PSK handshakes.
In response to our attack, Draft-13 included a resumption_context value derived from
the psk in the handshake hash, to ensure that the client’s signature over the hash cannot be
forwarded on another connection (with a different psk ′). This countermeasure has since evolved
to the MAC-based design showed in Figure 7, which has now been verified in this paper.
The Impact of Replay on 0-RTT and 0.5-RTT. It is now widely accepted that asynchronous
messaging protocols like 0-RTT cannot be easily protected from replay, since the recipient has no
chance to provide a random nonce that can ensure freshness. QUIC attempted to standardize a
replay-prevention mechanism but it has since abandoned this mechanism, since it cannot prevent
attackers from forcing the client to resend 0-RTT data over 1-RTT [72].
Instead of preventing replays, TLS 1.3 Draft-18 advises applications that they should only
send non-forward-secret and idempotent data over 0-RTT. This recommendation is hard to
systematically enforce in flexible protocols like HTTPS, where all requests have secret cookies
attached, and even GET requests routinely change state.
We argue that replays offer an important attack vector for 0-RTT and 0.5-RTT data. If
the client authenticates its 0-RTT flight, then an attacker can replay the entire flight to mount
authenticated replay attacks. Suppose the (client-authenticated) 0-RTT data asks the server
to send a client’s bank statement, and the server sends this data in a 0.5-RTT response. An
attacker who observes the 0-RTT request once, can replay it any number of times to the server
from anywhere in the world and the server will send it the user’s (encrypted) bank statement.
Although the attacker cannot complete the 1-RTT handshake or read this 0.5-RTT response, it
may be able to learn a lot from this exchange, such as the length of the bank statement, and
whether the client is logged in.
In response to these concerns, client authentication has now been removed from 0-RTT.
However, we note that similar replay attacks apply to 0-RTT data that contains an authentication
cookie or OAuth token. We highly recommend that TLS 1.3 servers should implement a replay
cache (based on the client nonce nC and the ticket age) to detect and reject replayed 0-RTT
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data. This is less practical in server farms, where time-based replay mitigation may be the only
alternative.
6 Computational Analysis of TLS 1.3 Draft-18
Our ProVerif analysis of TLS 1.3 Draft-18 identifies the necessary conditions under which the
symbolic security guarantees of the protocol hold. We now use the tool CryptoVerif [27] to see
whether these conditions are sufficient to obtain cryptographic security proofs for the protocol
in a more precise computational model. In particular, under the assumption that the algorithms
used in TLS 1.3 Draft-18 satisfy certain strong cryptographic assumptions, we prove that the
protocol meets our security goals.
Proofs in the computational model are hard to mechanize, and CryptoVerif offers less flexibil-
ity and automation than ProVerif. To obtain manageable proofs, we focus only on TLS 1.3 (we
do not consider TLS 1.2) and we ignore downgrade attacks. Moreover, we proceed modularly:
we first prove some lemmas on primitives, and we split the protocol into three pieces and prove
them separately using CryptoVerif, before composing them manually to obtain a proof for the
full protocol.
6.1 A Short Reminder on CryptoVerif
Processes, contexts, adversaries. CryptoVerif mechanizes proofs by sequences of games,
similar to those written on paper by cryptographers [76, 13]. It represents protocols and crypto-
graphic games in a probabilistic process calculus. We refer the reader to [27] for details on this
process calculus. We will explain the necessary constructs as they appear.
Even though CryptoVerif can evaluate the probability of success of an attack as a function
of the number of sessions and the probability of breaking each primitive (exact security), for
simplicity, we consider here the asymptotic framework in which we only show that the probability
of success of an attack is negligible as a function of the security parameter η. (A function f is
negligible when for all polynomials q, there exists ηo ∈ N such that for all η > η0, f(η) ≤ 1q(η) .)
All processes run in polynomial time in the security parameter and manipulate bitstrings of
polynomially bounded length.
A context C is a process with one or several holes [ ]. We write C[P1, . . . , Pn] for the process
obtained by replacing the holes of C with P1, . . . , Pn respectively. An evaluation context is a
context with one hole, generated by the following grammar:
C ::= evaluation context
[ ] hole
newChannel c;C channel restriction
Q | C parallel composition
C | Q parallel composition
The channel restriction newChannel c;Q restricts the channel name c, so that communications
on this channel can occur only inside Q, and cannot be received outside Q or sent from outside
Q. The parallel composition Q1 | Q2 makes simultaneously available the processes defined in Q1
and Q2. We use evaluation contexts to represent adversaries.
Indistinguishability. A process can execute events, by two constructs: event e(M1, . . . ,Mn)
executes event e with arguments M1, . . . ,Mn, and event_abort e executes event e without
argument and aborts the game. After finishing execution of a process, the system produces two
results: the sequence of executed events E , and the information whether the game aborted (a =
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abort, that is, executed event_abort) or terminated normally (a = 0). These events and result
can be used to distinguish games, so we introduce an additional algorithm, a distinguisher D that
takes as input the sequence of events E and the result a, and returns true or false. Distinguishers
must run in time polynomial in the security parameter. We write Pr[Q η D] for the probability
that the process Q executes events E and returns a result a such thatD(E , a) = true, with security
parameter η.
Definition 1 (Indistinguishability). We write Q ≈V Q′ when, for all evaluation contexts C
acceptable for Q and Q′ with public variables V and all distinguishers D, |Pr[C[Q]  η D] −
Pr[C[Q′] η D]| is a negligible function η.
Intuitively, Q ≈V Q′ means that an adversary has a negligible probability of distinguishing
Q from Q′, when it can read the variables in the set V . When V is empty, we omit it.
The condition that C is acceptable for Q and Q′ with public variables V is a technical
condition that guarantees that C[Q] and C[Q′] are well-formed. The public variables V are the
variables of Q and Q′ that C is allowed to read directly.
The relation ≈V Q′ is an equivalence relation, and Q ≈V Q′ implies C[Q] ≈V ′ C[Q′] for all
evaluation contexts C acceptable for Q and Q′ with public variables V and all V ′ ⊆ V ∪ var(C),
where var(C) is the set of variables of C.
Security assumptions on cryptographic primitives are given to CryptoVerif as indistinguisha-
bility properties that it considers as axioms.
Secrecy. Intuitively, in CryptoVerif, secrecy means that the adversary cannot distinguish be-
tween the secrets and independent random values. This definition corresponds to the “real-or-
random” definition of security [1]. A formal definition in CryptoVerif can be found in [29]. In
this paper, we use the characterization given in Lemma 1 below, which was used as a definition
of secrecy in versions of CryptoVerif that did not include event_abort [26, 27]. Let us first
explain some CryptoVerif constructs used in this lemma. The replication !i≤nQ represents n
copies of the process Q in parallel, indexed by i ∈ [1, n], where n is polynomial in the secu-
rity parameter η. In CryptoVerif, all variables defined under a replication are implicitly arrays
indexed by the replication indices: if Q defines a variable x under !i≤n, the value of x is in
fact stored in x[i]. The definition of x is executed at most once for each i, so that all values
of x are stored in distinct array cells. The find construct allows one to read these array cells:
find u = i′ ≤ n suchthat defined(x1[i′], . . . , xm[i′]) ∧M then P else P ′ looks for an index
i′ ∈ [1, n] such that x1[i′], . . . , xm[i′] are defined and M is true. When such an index is found, it
is stored in u, and process P is executed. Otherwise, process P ′ is executed. The term M may
refer to x1[i′], . . . , xm[i′] and the process P may refer to x1[u], . . . , xm[u] since these variables
are guaranteed to be defined. We sometimes use the same name for u and i′; in this case, we
simply write find u ≤ n suchthat . . . . The input c[i](x : T );P receives a message on a message
on channel c[i] and stores it in x if it is in the set of bitstrings T (T stands for “type”), and
executes P . If the received message is not in T , the process blocks. The channel c[i] consists
of a channel name c and indices, here i. Very often, the indices of channels correspond to the
indices of replications above the input: that allows the sender to tell precisely to which copy
of the process the message should be sent. Similarly, the output c[i]〈M〉;Q sends message M
on channel c[i]. After the output, the control is passed to the receiver process, which continues
execution. The process Q that follows the output consists of inputs, possibly under replications
and parallel compositions; these inputs will be executed when a message is sent to them. Finally,
the restriction new y : T ;P chooses uniformly a random element of T , stores it in y and executes
P .
To lighten notations, we use ũ as an abbreviation for a sequence of variables: ũ = u1, . . . , um.
We write ũ ≤ ñ for u1 : [1, n1], . . . , um : [1, nm] when ũ = u1, . . . , um and ñ = n1, . . . , nm. We
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say that a variable is defined under replications !̃i≤ñ when ĩ = i1, . . . , im, ñ = n1, . . . , nm, and it
is defined under replications !i1≤n1 . . . !im≤nm . (There may be other instructions between these
replications.)
Lemma 1. Let Q be a process that does not contain event_abort. Let
R0x = !
is≤ns cs[is](ũ ≤ ñ); if defined(x[ũ]) then cs[is]〈x[ũ]〉
R1x = !
is≤ns cs[is](ũ ≤ ñ); if defined(x[ũ]) then
find us1 = is1 ≤ ns suchthat defined(y[is1], ũ[is1]) ∧ ũ[is1] = ũ
then cs[is]〈y[us1]〉
else new y : T ; cs[is]〈y〉
where the channel cs and the variables ũ, us1, y do not occur in Q and the variable x has type T
and is defined under replications !̃i≤ñ in Q. Let Q◦ be obtained from Q by removing all events.
The process Q preserves the secrecy of x with public variables V (x /∈ V ) if and only if
Q◦ | R0x ≈V Q◦ | R1x.
This lemma provides a characterization of the secrecy of a variable x, defined under repli-
cations !̃i≤ñ, so x is actually an array with indices ĩ ≤ ñ. The processes R0x and R1x allow the
adversary to query the variable x: if the adversary sends indices ũ on channel cs[is], and x[ũ] is
defined, then the process R0x replies with the value of x[ũ]; instead, the process R1x replies with
a random value. The find in R1x makes sure that, if the indices ũ have already been queried,
then the previous reply is sent; otherwise, a fresh random value y is chosen in the type T of x
by new y : T , and sent as a reply. The replication !is≤ns in R0x and R1x allows the adversary to
perform at most ns such queries; ns is chosen large enough so that it is not a limitation. Lemma 1
says that x is secret with public variables V if and only if an adversary that can read variables V
cannot distinguish between Q◦ | R0x and Q◦ | R1x, that is, it cannot distinguish between the real
values of x and independent random values. (Previous definitions did not allow public variables;
this is a recent extension of CryptoVerif.)
Correspondences. Correspondences [81] are properties of executed sequences of events, such as
“if some event has been executed, then some other event has been executed”. They are typically
used for formalizing authentication. Given a correspondence corr , we define a distinguisher D
such that D(E , a) = true if and only if the sequence of events E satisfies the correspondence corr .
We write this distinguisher simply corr , and write ¬corr for its negation.
Definition 2 (Correspondence). The process Q satisfies the correspondence corr with public
variables V if and only if, for all evaluation contexts C acceptable for Q with public variables V
that do not contain events used in corr , Pr[C[Q] η ¬corr ] is negligible.
We refer the reader to [26] for more details on the verification of correspondences in Cryp-
toVerif. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2. If Q preserves the secrecy of x with public variables V (x /∈ V ) and C is an acceptable
evaluation context for Q with public variables V , then for all V ′ ⊆ V ∪ var(C), C[Q] preserves
the secrecy of x with public variables V ′.
If Q satisfies a correspondence corr with public variables V and C is an acceptable evaluation
context for Q with public variables V that does not contain events used in corr , then for all
V ′ ⊆ V ∪ var(C), C[Q] satisfies a correspondence corr with public variables V ′.
If Q ≈V ∪{x} Q′ and Q preserves the secrecy of x with public variables V , then so does Q′.
If Q ≈V Q′ and Q satisfies a correspondence corr with public variables V , then so does Q′.
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6.2 Cryptographic Assumptions
We make the following assumptions about the cryptographic algorithms supported by TLS 1.3
clients and servers.
Diffie-Hellman. We assume that the Diffie-Hellman groups used in TLS 1.3 satisfy the gap
Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption [68]. This assumption means that given g, ga, and gb for
random a, b, the adversary has a negligible probability to compute gab, even when the adversary
has access to a decisional Diffie-Hellman oracle, which tells him given G,X, Y, Z whether there
exist x, y such that X = Gx, Y = Gy, and Z = Gxy.
In our proof, we require GDH rather than the weaker decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) as-
sumption, in order to prove secrecy of keys on the server side as soon as the server sends its
Finished message: at this point, if the adversary controls a certificate accepted by the client,
he can send its own key share y′ to the client to learn information on gx
′y′ , and that would be
forbidden under DDH. We also require that xy = x′y implies x = x′ and that xy = xy
′
implies
y = y′, which holds when the considered Diffie-Hellman group is of prime order. This is true for
all groups currently specified in TLS 1.3 [67, 14, 49, 47], and our proof requires it for all groups
included in the future.
We also assume that all Diffie-Hellman group elements have a binary representation different
from 0lenH() . This assumption simplifies the proof by avoiding a possible confusion between
handshakes with and without Diffie-Hellman exchange. Curve25519 does have a 32-byte zero
element, but excluding zero Diffie-Hellman shared values is already recommended to avoid points
of small order [60].
Finally, we assume that all Diffie-Hellman group elements have a binary representation differ-
ent from lenH()‖“TLS 1.3, ”‖l‖h‖0x01. This helps ease our proofs by avoiding a collision between
hkdf-extract(es, e) and derive-secret(es, pbk, “”) or derive-secret(es, etsc, log1). This assumption
holds with the currently specified groups and labels, since group elements have a different length
than the bitstring above. The technical problem identified by our assumption was independently
discovered and discussed on the TLS mailing list [73], and has led to a change in Draft-19 which
makes this assumption unnecessary: in the key schedule, hkdf-extract is applied to the result of
derive-secret(es, ds, “”) instead of applying it to es.
Signatures. We assume that the function sign is unforgeable under chosen-message attacks
(UF-CMA) [48]. This means that an adversary with access to a signature oracle has a negligible
probability of forging a signature for a message not signed by the signature oracle. Only the
oracle has access to the signing key; the adversary has the public key.
Hash Functions. We assume that the function H is collision-resistant [40]: the adversary has
a negligible probability of finding two different messages with the same hash.
HMAC. We need two assumptions on HMAC-H:
We require that the functions x 7→ HMAC-H0
lenH()
(x) and x 7→ HMAC-Hkdf0(x) are inde-
pendent random oracles, in order to justify the use of HMAC-H as a randomness extractor in
the HKDF construct. This assumption can itself be justified as follows. Assuming that the
compression function underlying the hash function is a random oracle, Theorem 4.4 in [42]
shows that HMAC is indifferentiable [37] from a random oracle, provided the MAC keys are
less than the block size of the hash function minus one, which is true for HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512. It is then easy to show that x 7→ HMAC-H0
lenH()
(x) and
x 7→ HMAC-Hkdf0(x) are indifferentiable from independent random oracles in this case.
We assume that HMAC-H is a pseudo-random function (PRF) [10], that is, HMAC-H is in-
distinguishable from a random function provided its key is random and used only in HMAC-H,
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when the key is different from 0lenH() and kdf0. We avoid these two keys to avoid confusion with
the two random oracles above. Since keys are chosen randomly with uniform probability from a
set key (with cardinality |key|), the only consequence of avoiding these keys is that 2|key| is added
to the probability of breaking the PRF assumption.
Authenticated Encryption. The authenticated encryption scheme is IND-CPA (indistin-
guishable under chosen plaintext attacks) and INT-CTXT (ciphertext integrity) [12], provided
the same nonce is never used twice with the same key. IND-CPA means that the adversary
has a negligible probability of distinguishing encryptions of two distinct messages of the same
length that it has chosen. INT-CTXT means that an adversary with access to encryption and
decryption oracles has a negligible probability of forging a ciphertext that decrypts successfully
and has not been returned by the encryption oracle.
6.3 Lemmas on Primitives and on the Key Schedule
We show the following properties:
• mackH(m) = mac
k(H(m)) is an SUF-CMA (strongly unforgeable under chosen message attacks)
MAC. Indeed, since mac = HMAC-H is a PRF, it is an SUF-CMA MAC as shown in [11], and
this property is preserved by composition with a collision-resistant hash function.
• signskH (m) = sign
sk (H(m)) is an UF-CMA signature. Indeed, sign is an UF-CMA signature,
and this property is preserved by composition with a collision-resistant hash function.
We also prove several lemmas on the key schedule of TLS 1.3, using CryptoVerif.
• When es is a fresh random value, e 7→ hkdf-extract(es, e) and log1 7→ derive-secret(es, etsc, log1)
are indistinguishable from independent random functions, and kb = derive-secret(es, pbk, “”)
and hkdf-extract(es, 0lenH()) are indistinguishable from independent fresh random values inde-
pendent from these random functions.
• When hs is a fresh random value, log1 7→ derive-secret(hs, htsc, log1)‖derive-secret(hs, htss, log1)
is indistinguishable from a random function and hkdf-extract(hs, 0lenH()) is indistinguishable
from a fresh random value independent from this random function.
• When ms is a fresh random value, log4 7→ derive-secret(ms, atsc, log4)‖derive-secret(ms, atss,
log4)‖derive-secret(ms, ems, log4) and log7 7→ derive-secret(ms, rms, log7) are indistinguishable
from independent random functions.
• When l1, l2, l3 are pairwise distinct labels and s is a fresh random value, we have that the keys
hkdf-expand-label(s, li, “”) for i = 1, 2, 3 are indistinguishable from independent fresh random
values.
All random values considered above are uniformly distributed. We use these properties as as-
sumptions in our proof of the protocol. This modular approach considerably reduces the com-
plexity of the games that CryptoVerif has to consider.
These results suggest that the key schedule could be simplified by replacing groups of calls to
derive-secret that use the same key and log with a single call to derive-secret that would output
the concatenation of several keys. The same remark also holds for calls to hkdf-expand-label
that use the same key. This approach corresponds to the usage of expansion recommended
in the formalization of HKDF [55], and would simplify the proof: some lemmas above would
no longer be needed. We would also recommend replacing ms = hkdf-extract(hs, 0lenH()) with
ms = derive-secret(hs,ms, “”): that would be more natural since we use the PRF property of
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HMAC-H for this computation and not the randomness extraction. If the argument 0lenH() may
change in the future, then we would support the recommendation of applying hkdf-extract to
the result of derive-secret(hs,ms, “”), discussed on the TLS mailing list [73] and implemented in
Draft-19.
6.4 Verifying 1-RTT Handshakes without Pre-Shared Keys
To prove the security of TLS 1.3 in CryptoVerif, we split the protocol into three parts, as shown
in Figure 10, and verify them in sequence, before composing them by hand into a proof for the
full protocol. This modular hybrid approach allows us to have proofs of manageable complexity,
and to obtain results even when keys are reused many times, such as when several PSK-based
resumptions are performed, which would otherwise be out of scope of CryptoVerif.
We first consider the initial 1-RTT handshake shown in Figure 4, until the new client and
server session boxes. We model a honest client and a honest server, which are willing to interact
with each other, but also with dishonest clients and servers included in the adversary. We do
not consider details of the negotiation (or the RetryRequest message). We give the handshake
keys (khc and khs ) to the adversary, and let it encrypt and decrypt the handshake messages, so
our security proof does not rely on the encryption of the handshake.
We assume that the server is always authenticated and consider both the handshake with and
without client authentication. The honest client and server may be compromised at any time:
the secret key of the compromised participant is then sent to the adversary, and the compromise
is recorded by defining a variable corruptedClient or corruptedServer.
The outputs of this protocol are the application traffic secrets atsc and atss (the derivation of
the keys kc and ks from these secrets is left for the record protocol), the exporter master secret
ems, and the resumption master secret psk ′ (later used as pre-shared key).
This protocol is modeled in CryptoVerif as shown in Figure 8. The context Ch first chooses
randomly a key hk that models the choice of the random oracle HKDF_extract_zero_salt, that
is, x 7→ HMAC-H0
lenH()
(x). Then, it provides the process Qh, which allows the adversary to query
this random oracle by sending its query on channel ch3[ih] and receiving the result on channel
ch4[ih]. This random oracle is actually not used in the initial handshake; adding it simplifies the
composition with the handshake with pre-shared keys which uses it. The context C generates
keys, defines the random oracle x 7→ HMAC-Hkdf0(x) in the same style as Ch, deals with key
compromise, and runs client and server processes. We omit the details of this context to focus
on the way we specify security properties.
At the end of the client code, the context C runs the process PClientFinal. This process executes
event ClientTerm1 with three arguments: the messages until the server Finished message (log4),
the messages after the server Finished message until the client Finished message (messages in
log7 but not in log4), and the session keys. This event means that the client terminates. It is used
for the unique channel identifier property. Next, the process distinguishes two cases, depending
on whether the client is in a honest session or not. We say that the client is in a honest session
when the certificate it received is the one of the honest server, and either this server is not
corrupted or the messages received by the client come from the honest server. Intuitively, the
client is in a honest session when it talks to the honest server. In this case, the client executes
event ClientTerm with arguments the messages until the server Finished message (log4) and the
session keys (psk ′ excluded). It also executes event ClientAccept with arguments all messages
(log7), all session keys, and the replication index of the client iC . These events are used for key
authentication. It stores the keys atsc (that is, cats), ems, psk ′ (that is, resumption_secret) in
variables c_cats, c_ems, c_resumption_secret respectively. We shall prove the secrecy of these
variables. Finally, it outputs the final message (client Certificate, CertVerify, Finished).
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QIH = Ch[C[PClientFinal, PServer0.5-RTT]]
Ch = ch1();new hk : Thk ; ch2〈〉; ([ ] | Qh)
Qh = !
ih≤nhch3[ih](x : Th); ch4[ih]〈HKDF_extract_zero_salt(hk , x)〉
PClientFinal =
event ClientTerm1((cr , cgx , sr , cgy , log0 , log1 , scv ,m),final_log , (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , cats, c_sats, ems, resumption_secret));
if honestsession then
(
1: event ClientTerm((cr , cgx , sr , cgy , log0 , log1 , scv ,m), (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , cats, c_sats, ems));
2: event ClientAccept((cr , cgx , sr , cgy , log0 , log1 , scv ,m,final_log), (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , cats, c_sats, ems, resumption_secret), iC);
let c_cats : key = cats in
let c_ems : key = ems in




3: io7[iC ]〈(final_mess, (resumption_secret , cats, c_sats, ems))〉.
PServer0.5-RTT =
find j ≤ NC suchthat defined(cgx [j]) ∧ sgx = cgx [j] then
(
4: event ServerAccept((cr , sgx , sr , sgy , log0 , log1 , scv ,m), (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , cats, sats, ems), iS);









event ServerTerm1((cr , sgx , sr , sgy , log0 , certS , log1 , scv ,m), clientfinished , (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , s_cats1 , sats, s_ems1 , s_resumption_secret1 ));
if honestsession then
6: event ServerTerm((cr , sgx , sr , sgy , log0 , certS , log1 , scv ,m, clientfinished), (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , s_cats1 , sats, s_ems1 , s_resumption_secret1 ));
io27[iS ]〈〉
else
7: io28[iS ]〈(s_resumption_secret1 , s_cats1 , sats, s_ems1 )〉]
Figure 8: Model of the initial 1-RTT handshake
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When the client is not in a honest session, it just outputs the final message and the keys atsc,
atss, ems, psk ′, so that the adversary can continue the protocol. No security property is proved
in this case.
On the server side, the context C runs the server until it is ready to send the server Finished
message and 0.5-RTT data. Then it executes the process PServer0.5-RTT. This process distin-
guishes two cases, depending on whether the Diffie-Hellman key share gx
′
received by the server
comes from the honest client. If it does, it executes the event ServerAccept with arguments the
messages until the server Finished message (log4), the session keys (psk
′ excluded), and the
replication index of the server iS . It stores the key atss (that is, sats) in s_sats. We shall prove
secrecy of this key. Finally, it outputs the server CertVerify and Finished messages. When
the Diffie-Hellman key share received by the server does not come from the honest client, the
server outputs the CertVerify and Finished messages and the key atss so that the adversary
can send 0.5-RTT data by himself. We do not prove security of 0.5-RTT data in this case.
After that, the server continues with QServerAfter0.5-RTT1 or QServerAfter0.5-RTT2. The process
QServerAfter0.5-RTT1 executes event ServerTerm1 with three arguments: the messages until the
server Finished message (log4), the messages after the server Finished message until the client
Finished message (messages in log7 but not in log4), and the session keys. Next, the process
distinguishes two cases, depending on whether the server is in a honest session or not. We say
that the server is in a honest session when
• if the client is authenticated, the certificate received by the server is the one of the honest
client, and either this client is not corrupted or the messages received by the server come from
the honest client;
• if the client is not authenticated, the Diffie-Hellman key share gx
′
received by the server comes
from the honest client.
Intuitively, the server is in a honest session when it talks to the honest client. In this case, the
server executes event ServerTerm with arguments all messages (log7) and all session keys, and
finally outputs an empty message to return control to the adversary. When the server is not in a
honest session, it outputs the keys (psk ′, atsc, atss, ems), so that the adversary can continue the
protocol. No security property is proved in this case.
The process QServerAfter0.5-RTT2 is similar to QServerAfter0.5-RTT1, but with renamed chan-
nels (so that all channels are distinct) and variables s_resumption_secret1 , s_cats1 , s_ems1
renamed into s_resumption_secret2 , s_cats2 , s_ems2 . This renaming is necessary because,
when we prove secrecy of a variable, CryptoVerif requires that it is defined at a single location
of a game.
Let us define Vin = {c_cats, c_sats, c_ems, c_resumption_secret , s_cats1 , s_cats2 ,
s_sats, s_ems1 , s_ems2 , s_resumption_secret1 , s_resumption_secret2} the set of variables
containing the keys atsc, atss, ems, psk ′ in honest sessions, on the client and server sides.
CryptoVerif proves the following properties:
• Key Authentication: If the client terminates and is in a honest session, then the server has
accepted a session with the honest client, and they share the same parameters: the keys atsc,
atss, and ems and all messages sent in the protocol until the server Finished message. (We
can make no claim on the client Finished message because it has not been received by the
server at this point, nor on psk ′ because it depends on the client Finished message.) Formally,
CryptoVerif proves the correspondence
inj-event(ClientTerm(log4, keys)) =⇒ inj-event(ServerAccept(log4, keys, i)) (1)
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with public variables Vin, which means that, with overwhelming probability, each execution
of event ClientTerm corresponds to a distinct execution of event ServerAccept with the same
messages until server Finished and the same keys including atsc, atss, and ems. Event
ClientTerm is executed when the client terminates and is in a honest session, event ServerAccept
is executed when the server accepts a session with the client.
Conversely, if a server terminates and is in a honest session, then the client has accepted a
session with the honest server, and they agree on the established keys and on all messages sent
in the protocol. Formally, CryptoVerif proves the correspondence
inj-event(ServerTerm(log7, keys)) =⇒ inj-event(ClientAccept(log7, keys, i)) (2)
with public variables Vin, which means that, with overwhelming probability, each execution
of event ServerTerm corresponds to a distinct execution of event ClientAccept with the same
messages and keys.
• Replay Prevention: The authentication properties stated above are already injective (be-
cause of the presence of inj-event), that is, they guarantee that each session of the client
(resp. server) corresponds to a distinct session of the server (resp. client), and consequently,
they forbid replay attacks.
• (Forward) Secrecy of Keys: The keys atsc, atss, ems, and psk ′ exchanged in several
protocol sessions are indistinguishable from independent fresh random values. This property
means for instance that the keys atss remains secret (indistinguishable from independent fresh
random values) even if atsc, ems, psk ′ are given to the adversary, and similarly for the other
keys.
We prove secrecy of atss on the server side when the key share gx
′
comes from the client as
soon as the server sends its Finished message. This property allows us to prove security of
0.5-RTT messages by composition with the record protocol. Secrecy holds on the client side as
well, when the client is in a honest session, because the client uses the same key as the server
by key authentication. Formally, CryptoVerif proves that the protocol preserves the secrecy
of s_sats with public variables Vin \ {c_sats, s_sats}.
As noted in Section 3, the authentication for 0.5-RTT messages is weak: the client is not
authenticated yet, so in the proof of secrecy of atss, we require that the key share gx
′
comes
from the client. That weakens the authentication guarantees for all data received by an
authenticated client. We have also written an alternative model without 0.5-RTT messages,
in which we prove secrecy of atss on the client side when the client is in a honest session.
Similarly, we prove secrecy of atsc, ems, and psk ′ on the client side when the client is in
a honest session. Secrecy holds on the server side as well, when the server is in a honest
session, because the server uses the same key as the client by key authentication. Formally,
CryptoVerif proves that the protocol preserves the secrecy of c_cats with public variables
Vin \ {c_cats, s_cats1 , s_cats2}, of c_ems with public variables Vin \ {c_ems, s_ems1 ,
s_ems2}, and of c_resumption_secret with public variables Vin \ {c_resumption_secret ,
s_resumption_secret1 , s_resumption_secret2}.
• Unique Accept: The server never accepts twice with the honest client and the same messages
until the server Finished message. Formally, CryptoVerif proves the correspondence
event(ServerAccept(log4, s_keys, i)) ∧ event(ServerAccept(log4, s_keys
′, i′)) =⇒ i = i′ (3)
with public variables Vin: two ServerAccept events with the same messages must have the same
replication index, so they are in fact a single event.
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Similarly, the client never accepts twice with the honest server and the same messages until
the client Finished message. Formally, CryptoVerif proves the correspondence
event(ClientAccept(log7, c_keys, i)) ∧ event(ClientAccept(log7, c_keys
′, i′)) =⇒ i = i′ (4)
with public variables Vin.
The correspondences (1) and (3) imply the correspondence
event(ClientTerm(log4, c_keys))∧event(ServerAccept(log4, s_keys, i)) =⇒ c_keys = s_keys
Indeed, if ClientTerm(log4, c_keys) and ServerAccept(log4, s_keys, i) are executed, then by (1),
ServerAccept(log4, c_keys, i′) is executed, so by (3), i = i′, so ServerAccept(log4, s_keys, i)
and ServerAccept(log4, c_keys, i′) are in fact the same event, hence c_keys = s_keys. This
correspondence means that, if the client terminates and is in a honest session and the server
accepts a session with the honest client and with the same messages until the server Finished
message, then the client and server have the same keys atsc, atss, and ems. We name this
property “same keys”.
Similarly, the correspondences (2) and (4) imply
event(ServerTerm(log7, s_keys))∧event(ClientAccept(log7, c_keys, i)) =⇒ s_keys = c_keys
If the server terminates and is in a honest session and the client accepts a session with the
honest server and with the same messages until the client Finished message, then the client
and server have the same keys atsc, atss, ems, and psk ′.
The three properties key authentication with replay prevention, secrecy of keys, and same keys
are standard security properties for a key exchange protocol [26]. CryptoVerif could also prove
“same keys” directly, but we need (3) and (4) for composition.
• Unique Channel Identifier: When cid is psk ′ or H(log7), we do not use CryptoVerif as
the result is immediate: if a client session and a server session have the same cid , then these
sessions have the same log7 by collision-resistance of H (which implies collision-resistance of
HMAC-H), so all their parameters are equal.
When cid is ems, collision-resistance just yields that the client and server sessions have the
same log4. CryptoVerif proves that, if a client session and a server session both terminate
successfully with the same log4, then they have the same log7 and the same keys, so all their
parameters are equal. Formally, CryptoVerif proves the correspondence
event(ClientTerm1(sfl , c_cfl , c_keys)) ∧ event(ServerTerm1(sfl , s_cfl , s_keys))
=⇒ c_cfl = s_cfl ∧ c_keys = s_keys
(5)
We need to guide CryptoVerif in order to prove these properties, with the following main steps.
We first apply the security of the signature under the server key skS . We introduce tests to
distinguish cases, depending on whether the Diffie-Hellman share received by the server is a
share gx
′
from the client, and whether the Diffie-Hellman share received by the client is the share
gy generated by the server upon receipt of gx
′
. Then we apply the random oracle assumption on
x 7→ HMAC-Hkdf0(x), replace variables that contain gx′y with their values to make equality tests
m = gx
′y appear, and apply the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption. At this point, the handshake
secret hs is a fresh random value. We use the properties on the key schedule established in
Section 6.3 to show that the other keys are fresh random values, and apply the security of the
MAC and of the signature under the client key skC .
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6.5 Verifying Handshakes with Pre-Shared Keys
We now analyze the handshake protocol in Figure 7, up until the new client and server sessions
are established. The protocol begins with 0-RTT and continues on to 1-RTT. We consider both
variants of PSK-based 1-RTT, with and without Diffie-Hellman exchange.
We ignore the ticket enckt(psk) and consider a honest client and a honest server that initially
share the pre-shared key psk . Dishonest clients and servers may be included in the adversary.
As in the previous section, we give the handshake keys (khc and khs ) to the adversary and ignore
handshake encryption. Certificates for the client and server are optional, since they are already
authenticated via the psk ; we do not rely on authentication in our proofs and consider that the
adversary performs the signature and verification operations on certificates if they occur.
The outputs of this protocol are the client early traffic secret etsc (the derivation of the key
kc from etsc is left for the record protocol), the application traffic secrets atsc and atss, the
exporter master secret ems, and the resumption master secret psk ′.
This protocol is modeled in CryptoVerif as shown in Figure 9, after moving some ran-
dom number generations and assignments. The process first defines the random oracle x 7→
HMAC-H0
lenH()
(x) using the context Ch as in Figure 8. Then it chooses a fresh pre-shared key
psk . (The input and output just allow the adversary to schedule this choice.) Finally, it launches
processes for the client and the server, for the handshakes with and without Diffie-Hellman
exchange.
The process QPSKOnlyClient represents the client for a handshake with pre-shared key and
without Diffie-Hellman exchange. The context CPSKOnlyClient builds the ClientHello message
and computes the early traffic secret etsc. Then the process inserts the ClientHello message
(nonce c_cr , binder c_binder , and other elements varc_log1, c_log1 ′) in the table c_table.
Tables are lists of tuples shared between all honest participants of the protocol. They can be read
by the get construct: get Tbl(x1, . . . , xl) suchthat M in P else P ′ tries to retrieve an element
(x1, . . . , xl) in the table Tbl such that M is true. When such an element is found, it executes P
with x1, . . . , xl bound to that element. When no such element is found, P ′ is executed. Equality
tests = Mi are also allowed instead of variables xi; in this case, the table element must contain
the value of Mi at the i-th position. Then, the process executes the event ClientEarlyAccept1
with arguments the ClientHello message, etsc (that is, cets), and the replication index of the
client iC , and stores cets in c_cets. These operations are useful to establish security of 0-RTT
data. Then it outputs the ClientHello message and continues the protocol until the client
Finished message. It executes the event ClientTerm1 with three arguments: the messages until
the server Finished message, the messages after the server Finished message until the client
Finished message, and the session keys. This event means that the client terminates. It is
used for the unique channel identifier property. Next, the process stores atss into c_sats. It
executes event ClientTerm with arguments the messages until the server Finished message and
the session keys (psk ′ excluded). It also executes event ClientAccept with arguments all messages
(log7), all session keys, and the replication index of the client iC . These events are used for key
authentication. It stores the keys atsc (that is, cats), ems, psk ′ (that is, resumption_secret) in
variables c_cats, c_ems, c_resumption_secret respectively. We shall prove the secrecy of these
variables. Finally, it outputs the final message (client Certificate, CertVerify, Finished).
The process QPSKOnlyServer represents the server for a handshake with pre-shared key and
without Diffie-Hellman exchange. The context CPSKOnlyServer receives the ClientHello mes-
sage, and runs two holes in parallel. The first hole deals with the reception of 0-RTT data. It
distinguishes several cases. When the received ClientHello comes unaltered from the honest
client (it is in the table c_table), it stores the early traffic secret in s_cets2 , executes event
ServerEarlyTerm1 with arguments the ClientHello message and s_cets2 , and returns control to
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QPSKH = Ch[io22();new psk : key ; io23〈〉; (CPSKClient[QPSKOnlyClient | QPSKDHEClient] |
CPSKServer[QPSKOnlyServer | QPSKDHEServer])]
QPSKOnlyClient = CPSKOnlyClient[
insert c_table(c_cr , c_log1 , c_binder , c_log1 ′);
1: event ClientEarlyAccept1((c_cr , c_log1 , c_binder , c_log1 ′), cets, iC);
let c_cets : key = cets in
io2[iC ]〈ClientHelloOut(c_cr , c_binder)〉;
C′PSKOnlyClient[
event ClientTerm1((c_cr , c_log1 , c_binder , c_log1 ′, sr , log2 , log3 ,m), (log4 , cfin), (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , cats, sats, ems, resumption_secret));
let c_sats : key = sats in
2: event ClientTerm((c_cr , c_log1 , c_binder , c_log1 ′, sr , log2 , log3 ,m), (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , cats, c_sats, ems));
3: event ClientAccept((c_cr , c_log1 , c_binder , c_log1 ′, sr , log2 , log3 ,m, log4 , cfin), (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , cats, c_sats, ems, resumption_secret), iC);
let c_cats : key = cats in
let c_ems : key = ems in




get c_table(= s_cr ,= s_log1 ,= s_binder ,= s_log1 ′) in
let s_cets2 : key = get_client_ets(cets_eems) in
4: event ServerEarlyTerm1((s_cr , s_log1 , s_binder , s_log1 ′), s_cets2 );
io12′[iS ]〈〉
else
let s_cets3 : key = get_client_ets(cets_eems) in
5: event ServerEarlyTerm2((s_cr , s_log1 , s_binder , s_log1 ′), s_cets3 );
find us ≤ NS suchthat defined(s_cr [us], s_log1 [us], s_binder [us], s_log1 ′[us], s_cets1 [us]) ∧




let s_cets1 : key = s_cets3 in
io14′[iS ]〈〉,
6: event ServerAccept((s_cr , s_log1 , s_binder , s_log1 ′, sr , log2 , log3 ,m), (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , cats, sats, ems), iS);
let s_sats : key = sats in
io18[iS ]〈ServerFinishedOut(m)〉;
C′PSKOnlyServer[
event ServerTerm1((s_cr , s_log1 , s_binder , s_log1 ′, sr , log2 , log3 ,m), (log4 , cfin), (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , cats, sats, ems, resumption_secret));
let s_cats : key = cats in
let s_ems : key = ems in
let s_resumption_secret : key = resumption_secret in
7: event ServerTerm((s_cr , s_log1 , s_binder , s_log1 ′, sr , log2 , log3 ,m, log4 , cfin), (client_hk ,
server_hk , client_hiv , server_hiv , cfk , sfk , s_cats, sats, s_ems, s_resumption_secret));
io30[iS ]〈〉]]
Figure 9: Model of the handshakes with pre-shared key
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the adversary. In this case, we are going to show that 0-RTT data is secure: it is authenticated
and confidential, but may be replayed. Otherwise, it stores the early traffic secret in s_cets3 ,
executes event ServerEarlyTerm2 with arguments the ClientHellomessage and s_cets2 , and fur-
ther distinguishes two cases: either the received ClientHello message has already been received
before, and we are going to reuse the previous early traffic secret, or it is a new ClientHello mes-
sage and we store the early traffic secret in s_cets1 . We shall prove that this variable is secret,
and that, when the server receives an altered ClientHello message, it cannot receive 0-RTT
data. The second hole deals with the rest of the protocol. It first executes event ServerAccept
with arguments the messages until the server Finishedmessage, the session keys (psk ′ excluded),
and the replication index of the server iS . It stores the key atss in s_sats. We shall prove secrecy
of this key, used for 0.5-RTT data. Finally, it outputs the server CertVerify and Finished mes-
sages. Then the server receives the client Finished message, executes event ServerTerm1 with
three arguments: the messages until the server Finished message, the messages after the server
Finished message until the client Finished message, and the session keys. It stores the keys
atsc, ems, psk ′ (that is, resumption_secret) in variables s_cats, s_ems, s_resumption_secret
respectively. It executes event ServerTerm with arguments all messages and all session keys, and
finally outputs an empty message.
The processes for the handshake with Diffie-Hellman exchange are similar. Obviously, they
additionally perform the Diffie-Hellman exchange. The events ClientEarlyAccept1, ClientTerm,
ClientAccept, ServerEarlyTerm1, ServerEarlyTerm2, ServerAccept, and ServerTerm have an addi-
tional suffix DHE. The variables and tables have prefix cdhe_ instead of c_ and sdhe_ instead
of s_.
The set of variables Vpsk contains all variables with prefixes c_, s_, cdhe_, and sdhe_.
We run CryptoVerif on our model to obtain the following verification results:
• Key Authentication, Replay Prevention, Secrecy of Keys, Unique Accept: Cryp-
toVerif shows the same properties as for the handshake without pre-shared key, with similar
queries. The differences are as follows: the key psk is never compromised, so the client and
server are always in a honest session; the queries are duplicated for the handshake with and
without Diffie-Hellman exchange; the variables are not duplicated for the distinction whether
the Diffie-Hellman key share received by the server comes from the client or not in 0.5-RTT,
but are duplicated for the handshake with and without Diffie-Hellman exchange.
• 0-RTT data: CryptoVerif cannot prove authentication of etsc. While the binder mackb(·)
authenticates most of the client ClientHello message, the client may offer several pre-shared
keys and send a binder for each of these keys. Only the binder for the pre-shared key selected
by the server is checked. Hence the adversary may alter another of the proposed binders,
yielding a different log1 and a different etsc on the server side. This is not a serious attack, as
the record protocol will fail if etsc does not match on the client and server sides.
CryptoVerif cannot prove replay protection for the 0-RTT session key etsc, and indeed the
client ClientHello message can be replayed, yielding the same key etsc for several sessions of
the server even though there is a single session of the client.
Secrecy of etsc holds on the client side; on the server side, each key etsc is indistinguishable
from random, but the keys etsc are not independent of each other since an adversary may
force the server to accept several times the same key etsc by replaying the client ClientHello
message.
CryptoVerif shows that, if the server receives the ClientHello message unaltered, then the
client sent it (obviously!) and the client and server share the same early traffic secret etsc.
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Formally,
event(ServerEarlyTerm1(log1 , cets)) =⇒ event(ClientEarlyAccept1(log1 , cets, i)) (6)
with public variables Vpsk. It shows that the client never sends twice the same ClientHello
message. Formally,
event(ClientEarlyAccept1(log1 , cets, i)) ∧ event(ClientEarlyAccept1(log1 , cets ′, i′)) =⇒ i = i′
(7)
with public variables Vpsk. It shows that etsc is secret on the client side. Formally, it shows
the secrecy of c_cets with public variables Vpsk \ {c_cets, s_cets2}. These three properties
provide security for a key exchange with one-way non-injective authentication. (The corre-
spondences (6) and (7) imply a “same key” property:
event(ClientEarlyAccept1(log1 , cets, i))∧event(ServerEarlyTerm1(log1 , cets ′)) =⇒ cets = cets ′
as in the initial handshake.)
CryptoVerif also shows that, if the server receives twice the same altered ClientHellomessage,
then it computes the same early traffic secret etsc. Formally,
event(ServerEarlyTerm2(log1 , cets)) ∧ event(ServerEarlyTerm2(log1 , cets ′)) =⇒ cets = cets ′
(8)
with public variables Vpsk. Finally, it shows the secrecy of s_cets1 with public variables
Vpsk \ {s_cets1 , s_cets3}. These two properties deal with the case in which the ClientHello
message is altered. They show that in this case, etsc is fresh secret random value when that
ClientHello is received for the first time, and that it is the same as the previous etsc when
ClientHello is replayed. By composition with the record protocol, they imply that the server
fails to receive 0-RTT data in this case.
CryptoVerif shows the same properties for the handshake with Diffie-Hellman exchange.
• Forward Secrecy: CryptoVerif is unable to prove secrecy of the keys when psk is compro-
mised after the end of the session, even assuming that hkdf-extract is a random oracle. Secrecy
obviously does not hold in this case for the handshake without Diffie-Hellman exchange. We
believe that it still holds for the handshake with Diffie-Hellman exchange; our failure to prove
it in this case is due to the current limitations of CryptoVerif.
• Unique Channel Identifier: We proceed as in the handshake without pre-shared key. We
additionally notice that, if a client session and a server session have the same log7, then they
have the same psk . Indeed, by collision-resistance of mac = HMAC-H, they have the same kb,
so the same es, so the same psk .
6.6 Verifying the Record Protocol
The third component of TLS 1.3 is the record protocol that encrypts and decrypts messages after
the new client and server sessions have been established in Figures 4 and 7.
In our model, we assume that the client and server share a fresh random traffic secret. We
generate an encryption key and an initialization vector (IV), and send and receive encrypted
messages using those key and IV, and a counter that is distinct for each message. (Our model
is more detailed than the symbolic presentation given in the figures as we consider the IV and
the counter.) We also generate a new traffic secret as specified in the key update mechanism of
TLS 1.3 Draft-18 (Section 7.2).
More formally, after moving some assignments, our model of the record protocol in Cryp-
toVerif is of the following form
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Rec = c1();new b : bool ;new ts : key ; let tsupd : key = HKDF_expand_upd_label(ts) in c2〈〉;
(Qsend(b) | Qrecv)
It chooses a random bit b (false = 0 or true = 1) and a random traffic secret ts. It computes
the updated traffic secret tsupd , and then provides two processes Qsend(b) and Qrecv. The
process Qsend(b) receives two clear messages msg0 and msg1, and a counter count . Provided the
counter has not been used for sending a previous message and the messages msg0 and msg1 have
the same padded length, it executes the event sent0(count ,msgb) and sends the message msgb
encrypted using keys derived from the traffic secret ts. The process Qrecv receives an encrypted
message and a counter count . Provided the counter has not been used for receiving a previous
message, it decrypts the message using keys derived from the traffic secret ts and executes event
received0(count ,msg) where msg is the clear message. Both the emission and reception can be
executed several times.
CryptoVerif proves the following properties automatically:
• Key Secrecy: CryptoVerif proves that the updated traffic secret is indistinguishable from a
fresh random value. Formally, CryptoVerif proves that tsupd is secret with public variable b.
• Message Secrecy: CryptoVerif proves that, when the adversary provides two sets of plain-
texts mi and m′i of the same padded length, it is unable to determine which of the two sets is
encrypted, even when the updated traffic secret is leaked. Formally, CryptoVerif proves that
b is secret with public variable tsupd .
• Message Authentication: CryptoVerif proves that, if a message msg is decrypted by the
receiver with a counter count , then the message msg has been encrypted and sent by an honest
sender with the same counter count . Formally, CryptoVerif proves the correspondence
event(received0(count ,msg)) =⇒ event(sent0(count ,msg))
with public variables b, tsupd .
• Replay Prevention: CryptoVerif shows that any sent application data may be accepted at
most once by the receiver. Formally, CryptoVerif proves the correspondence
inj-event(received0(count ,msg)) =⇒ inj-event(sent0(count ,msg))
with public variables b, tsupd , which means that each execution of event received0(count ,msg)
corresponds to a distinct execution of sent0(count ,msg). This correspondence implies message
authentication.
We consider two other variants of the record protocol, used for 0-RTT. In the first variant,
Rec0-RTT, the receiver process is replicated once more, so that several sessions may have the
same traffic secret, thus the receiver accepts messages with the same counter in different sessions
with the same traffic secret. It models that the server may receive several times the same
ClientHello message, yielding the same traffic secret. In this model, CryptoVerif proves key
and message secrecy and message authentication but not replay prevention. In the second variant,
Rec0-RTT,Bad, the sender process is additionally removed. This model corresponds to the situation
in which the ClientHello message is altered, and thus the server obtains a traffic secret that
is not used by any client. In this model, CryptoVerif proves key secrecy, and that the received0
event has a negligible probability of being executed: event(received0(count ,msg)) =⇒ false with
public variable tsupd .
RR n° 9040
40 Bhargavan & Blanchet & Kobeissi
Handshake without pre-shared
key








Figure 10: Structure of the CryptoVerif proof
6.7 A Composite Proof for TLS 1.3 Draft-18
We compose these results using a hybrid argument (as in [44]). Figure 10 summarizes the
structure of the composition. We provide only a brief sketch of the composition. The detailed
proof is in progress.
First, we compose the record protocol Rec with itself recursively, using the secrecy of the
updated traffic secret, to show that the security properties of the record protocol are pre-
served by key updates. We also perform similar compositions for the two variants Rec0-RTT
and Rec0-RTT,Bad of the record protocol for 0-RTT. We obtain processes Recm, Rec0-RTTm, and
Rec0-RTT,Bad
m that perform at most m key updates, for any m.
Second, we compose the handshakes with pre-shared key with the record protocol:
• using the secret key c_cats as traffic secret in the process Recm for 1-RTT client-to-server
messages: the sender side is plugged after event ClientAccept at line 3: and the receiver side is
plugged after event ServerTerm at line 7: in Figure 9;
• using the secret key s_sats as traffic secret in the process Recm for 0.5-RTT and 1-RTT
server-to-client messages: the sender side is plugged after event ServerAccept at line 6: and
the receiver side is plugged after event ClientTerm at line 2: in Figure 9;
• using the secret key c_cets as traffic secret in the process Rec0-RTTm for 0-RTT messages
when the ClientHello message has not been altered: the sender side is plugged after event
ClientEarlyAccept1 at line 1: and the receiver side is plugged after event ServerEarlyTerm1 at
line 4: in Figure 9;
• using the secret key s_cets3 as traffic secret in the process Rec0-RTT,Badm for 0-RTT when
the ClientHello message has been altered: the receiver process is plugged after event
ServerEarlyTerm2 at line 5: in Figure 9. (There is no sender process in this case.)
We perform similar compositions in the handshake with pre-shared key and Diffie-Hellman key
agreement. We also compose the obtained process with itself recursively, using the resumption
secret c_resumption_secret as pre-shared key in the next handshake: the client side is plugged
after event ClientAccept at line 3: and the server side is plugged after event ServerTerm at line 7:
in Figure 9. We perform a similar composition with secret cdhe_resumption_secret .
For these compositions, we rely the properties of key secrecy, key authentication with replay
prevention, and unique accept. We use the key secrecy property to replace session keys with
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independent fresh random values. We rely on authentication with replay prevention and unique
accept to show that the same replacement is performed in matching sessions of the client and
server. For 0-RTT, the authentication is weaker (we do not have replay prevention), so we
need to adapt our composition theorems to this case. The composed protocol inherits security
properties from the components we compose. In particular, we obtain secrecy, authentication,
and replay prevention for 0.5-RTT and 1-RTT application messages in both directions. For 0-
RTT messages, since the handshake does not prevent replays for this key, the composition will
not prevent replays for messages sent under this key. These compositions yield processes Ql,mPSKH
that perform at most l successive handshakes with pre-shared key and m key updates.
Third, we compose the initial handshake with the record protocol
• using the secret key c_cats as traffic secret in the process Recm for 1-RTT client-to-server
messages: the sender side is plugged after event ClientAccept at line 2: and the receiver side is
plugged after event ServerTerm at line 6: in Figure 8 and in the process QServerAfter0.5-RTT2;
• using the secret key s_sats as traffic secret in the process Recm for 0.5-RTT and 1-RTT
server-to-client messages: the sender side is plugged after event ServerAccept at line 4: and
the receiver side is plugged after event ClientTerm at line 1: in Figure 8.
We also compose the initial handshake with the process Ql,mPSKH,s that runs handshakes with
pre-shared key, using the secret key c_resumption_secret as pre-shared key: the client side is
plugged after event ClientAccept at line 2: and the server side is plugged after event ServerTerm
at line 6: in Figure 8 and in the process QServerAfter0.5-RTT2. (The forward secrecy property
of the initial handshake allows us to leak the keys skS and skC , so that the adversary can
indeed perform the signature operations related to certificates, as we assumed in our model of
handshakes with pre-shared keys.)
Finally, we compose the obtained process with a process that runs the rest of the TLS protocol
without any event or security claim, at lines 3:, 5:, 7: of Figure 8 and at a line similar to 7: in
the process QServerAfter0.5-RTT2.
These compositions allow us to infer security properties of the TLS protocol from properties
of the handshakes and the record protocol. In particular, we obtain secrecy, forward secrecy
(with respect to the compromise of skS and skC), authentication, and replay prevention for 0.5-
RTT and 1-RTT application messages in both directions. For 0-RTT messages, we do not obtain
replay prevention, but still obtain secrecy, forward secrecy (with respect to the compromise of
skS and skC), and authentication.
7 RefTLS: a Reference TLS 1.3 Implementation
with a Verified Protocol Core
In today’s web ecosystem, TLS is used by wide variety of client and server applications to establish
secure channels across the Internet. For example, Node.js servers are written in JavaScript
and can accept HTTPS connections using a Node’s builtin https module that calls OpenSSL.
Popular desktop applications, such as WhatsApp messenger, are also written in JavaScript using
the Electron framework (which combines Node.js with the Chromium rendering engine); they
connect to servers using the same https module.
Our goal is to develop a high-assurance reference implementation of TLS 1.3, called RefTLS,
that can be seamlessly used by Electron apps and Node.js servers. We want our implementation to
be small, easy to read and analyze, and effective as an early experimental version of TLS 1.3 that
real-world applications can use to help them transition to TLS 1.3, before it becomes available
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in mainstream libraries like OpenSSL. Crucially, we want to be able to verify the security of
the core protocol code in RefTLS, and show that it avoids both protocol-level attacks as well as
implementation bugs in its protocol state machine [15].
In this section, we describe RefTLS and evaluate its progress towards these goals. RefTLS
has been used as a prototype implementation of TLS Draft-13 to Draft-18, interoperating with
other early TLS 1.3 libraries. Its protocol core has been symbolically analyzed with ProVerif,
and it has been successfully integrated into Electron applications.
Flow and ProScript. RefTLS is written in Flow [36], a typed variant of JavaScript. Static
typing in Flow guarantees the absence of a large class of classic JavaScript bugs, such as reading
a missing field in an object. Consequently, our code looks very much like a program in a typed
functional language like OCaml or F#. We would like to verify the security of all our Flow code,
but since Flow is a fully-fledged programming language, it has loops, mutable state, and many
other features that are hard to automatically verify.
In earlier work, we developed a typed subset of JavaScript called ProScript [54] that was de-
signed for writing cryptographic protocol code that could be compiled automatically to ProVerif.
ProScript is also a subset of Flow and so we can reuse its ProVerif compiler to extract symbolic
models from the core protocol code in RefTLS, if we write it carefully.
ProScript code is written defensively, in that it cannot, even accidentally, access external
libraries or extensible JavaScript functionalities such as object instantiation, or redefinable prop-
erties such as Array.split. These restrictions are necessary in JavaScript where external functions
can completely redefine the behavior of all libraries and object prototypes. The resulting style
enforces syntactic scoping and strict type checking for all variables and functions, and disallows
implicit coercions, object prototype access, and dynamic extensions of arrays and objects.
For ease of analysis, ProScript disallows loops, recursion, and only allows access mutable
state through a well defined table interface. These are significant restrictions, but as we show,
the resulting language is still expressive enough to write the core composite protocol code for
TLS 1.0-1.3.
Implementation Structure. Figure 11 depicts the architecture of RefTLS and shows how
it can be safely integrated into larger, unverified and untrusted applications. At the top, we
have Node.js and Electron applications written in JavaScript. RefTLS exposes an interface to
these applications that exactly matches that of the default Node.js https module (which uses
OpenSSL), allowing these applications to transparently use RefTLS instead of OpenSSL.
The RefTLS code itself is divided into untrusted Flow code that handles network connections
and implements the API, a verified protocol module, written in ProScript, and some trusted
but unverified Flow code for parsing and serializing TLS messages. All this code is statically
typechecked in Flow. The core protocol module, called RefTLS-CORE, implements all the
cryptographic operations of the protocol. It exposes an interface that allows RefTLS to drive
the protocol, but hides all keying material and sensitive session state within the core module.
This isolation is currently implemented via the Node module system; but we can also exploit
Electron’s multi-threading feature in order to provide thread-based isolation to the RefTLS-
CORE module, allowing it to only be accessed through a pre-defined RPC interface. Strong
isolation for RefTLS-CORE allows us to verify it without relying on the correctness of the rest
of the RefTLS codebase.
However, RefTLS still relies on the security and correctness of the crypto library and the
underlying Electron, Node.js, and JavaScript runtimes. In the future, we may be able to reduce
this trusted computing base by relying on verified crypto [82], verified JavaScript interpreters [33],
and least-privilege architectures, such as ESpectro [77], which can control access to dangerous
libraries from JavaScript.
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Figure 11: RefTLS Architecture. The library is written in Flow, a typed subset of JavaScript.
The protocol core is verified by translation to ProVerif. The cryptographic library, message
formatting and parsing, and the runtime framework are trusted. The application and parts of
the RefTLS library are untrusted (assumed to be adversarial in our model).
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TLS 1.2 Handshake 16ms 7ms 8ms 6ms
TLS 1.2 Handshake 36ms 59ms
TLS 1.3 Handshake 34ms 28ms
Fetch 100MB 1163ms 730ms
Figure 12: In the first benchmark, RefTLS and Node.js’s HTTPS module perform handshakes
against OpenSSL. In the second and third benchmarks, we test RefTLS against itself. In the
fourth benchmark, the clients attempt to fetch 100MB of data from OpenSSL over TLS 1.2.
A Verified Protocol Core. In RefTLS-CORE, we develop, implement and verify (for the
first time) a composite state machine for TLS 1.2 and 1.3 (shown in Appendix A). Each state
transition is implemented by a ProScript function that processes a flight of incoming messages,
changes the session state, and produces a flight of outgoing messages. For TLS 1.3 clients, these
functions are get_client_hello, put_server_hello, and put_server_finished; servers use
the functions put_client_hello, get_server_finished, and put_client_finished.
We then use the ProScript compiler to translate this module into a ProVerif script that looks
much like the protocol models described in earlier sections of this paper. (See [54] for details of
the translation.) Each pure function in ProScript translates to a ProVerif function; functions that
modify mutable state are translated to ProVerif processes that read and write from tables. The
interface of the module is compiled to a top-level process that exposes a subset of the protocol
functions to the adversary over a public channel.
The adversary can call these functions in any order and any number of times, to initiate
connections in parallel, to provide incoming flights of messages, and to obtain outgoing flights
of messages. The ProVerif model uses internal tables, not accessible to the attacker, to manage
state updates between flights and preserve state invariants through the protocol execution.
Our approach allows us to quickly obtain verifiable ProVerif models from running RefTLS
code. For example, we were able to rapidly prototype changes to the TLS 1.3 specification
between Draft-13 and Draft-18, while testing for interoperability and analyzing the core protocol
at the same time. In particular, we extracted a model from our Draft-18 implementation, and
verified our security goals from §3 and §5 with ProVerif.
We engineered the ProScript compiler to generate readable ProVerif models that can be mod-
ified by a protocol analyst to experiment with different threat models. We are working towards
applying the same automated translation approach towards CryptoVerif models. CryptoVerif
syntax differs slightly from the ProVerif syntax, yet there is ongoing work in the CryptoVerif
team to have it accept the same source syntax as ProVerif. However, the kind of models that are
easy to verify using CryptoVerif differ from the models that ProVerif can automatically verify,
and the assumptions on cryptographic primitives will always remain different. Therefore, even if
the source syntax is the same, we may need to adapt our compiler to generate different models
for ProVerif and CryptoVerif.
Evaluation: Verification, Interoperability, Performance. The full RefTLS codebase con-
sists of about 6500 lines of Flow code, including 3000 lines of trusted libraries (mostly message
parsing), 2500 lines of untrusted application code, and 1000 lines of verified protocol core. From
the core, we extracted an 800 line protocol model in ProVerif and composed it with our generic
library from §2. Verifying this model took several hours on a powerful workstation.
RefTLS implements TLS 1.0-1.3, and interoperates with all major TLS libraries for TLS 1.0-
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1.2. Fewer libraries currently implement TLS 1.3, but RefTLS participated in the IETF
Hackathon and achieved interoperability with other implementations of Draft-14. It now in-
teroperates with NSS (Firefox) and BoringSSL (Chrome) for Draft-18.
By implementing Node’s https interface, we are able to naturally integrate RefTLS within
any Node or Electron application. We demonstrate the utility of this approach by integrating
RefTLS into the Brave web browser, which is written in Electron. We are able to intercept all
of Brave’s HTTPS requests and reliably fulfill them through RefTLS.
We benchmarked RefTLS against Node.js’s default OpenSSL-based HTTPS stack when run
against an OpenSSL peer over TLS 1.2. Our results are shown in Figure 12. In terms of compu-
tational overhead, RefTLS is two times slower than Node’s native library, which is not surprising
since RefTLS is written in JavaScript, whereas OpenSSL is written in C. In exchange for speed,
RefTLS offers an early implementation of TLS 1.3 and a verified protocol core. Furthermore, in
many application scenarios, network latency dominates over crypto, so the performance penalty
of RefTLS may not be that noticeable.
8 Discussion and Related Work
Symbolic Analysis of TLS 1.3. We symbolically analyzed a composite model of TLS 1.3 Draft-
18 with optional client authentication, PSK-based resumption, and PSK-based 0-RTT, running
alongside TLS 1.2 against a rich threat model, and we established a series of security goals.
In summary, 1-RTT provides forward secrecy, authentication and unique channel identifiers,
0.5-RTT offers weaker authentication, and 0-RTT lacks forward secrecy and replay protection.
We discovered potential vulnerabilities in 0-RTT client authentication in earlier draft versions.
These attacks were presented at the TLS Ready-Or-Not (TRON) workshop and contributed to
the removal of certificate-based 0-RTT client authentication from TLS 1.3. The current design
of PSK binders in Draft-18 is also partly inspired by these kinds of authentication attacks.
TLS 1.3 has been symbolically analyzed before, using the Tamarin prover [39]. ProVerif
and Tamarin are both state-of-the-art protocol analyzers with different strengths. Tamarin can
verify arbitrary compositions of protocols by relying on user-provided lemmas, whereas ProVerif
is less expressive but offers more automation. In terms of protocol features, the Tamarin analysis
covered PSK and ECDHE handshakes for 0-RTT and 1-RTT in Draft-10, but did not consider
0-RTT client certificate authentication or 0.5-RTT data. On the other hand, they do consider
delayed (post-handshake) authentication, which we did not consider here.
The main qualitative improvement in our verification results over theirs is that we consider
a richer threat model that allows for downgrade attacks, and that we analyze TLS 1.3 in com-
position with previous versions of the protocol, whereas they verify TLS 1.3 in isolation.
Our full ProVerif development consists of 1030 lines of ProVerif; including a generic library
incorporating our threat model (400 lines), processes for TLS 1.2 (200 lines) and TLS 1.3 (250
lines), and security queries for TLS 1.2 (50 lines) and TLS 1.3 (180 lines). All proofs complete
in about 70 minutes on a powerful workstation. In terms of manual effort, these models took
about 3 person-weeks for a ProVerif expert.
Computational Proofs for TLS 1.3. We presented the first mechanically-checked crypto-
graphic proof for TLS 1.3, developed using the CryptoVerif prover. We prove secrecy, forward
secrecy with respect to the compromise of long-term keys, authentication, replay prevention (ex-
cept for 0-RTT data), and existence of a unique channel identifier for TLS 1.3 draft-18. Our
analysis considers PSK modes with and without DHE key exchange, with and without client
authentication. It includes 0-RTT and 0.5-RTT data, as well as key updates, but not post-
handshake authentication.
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Unlike the ProVerif analysis, our CryptoVerif model does not consider compositions of client
certificates and pre-shared keys in the same handshake. It also does not account for version
or ciphersuite negotiation; instead, we assume that the client and server only support TLS 1.3
with strong cryptographic algorithms. The reason we limit the model in this way is to make the
proofs more tractable, since CryptoVerif is not fully automated and requires significant input
from the user. With future improvements in the tool, we may be able to remove some of these
restrictions.
CryptoVerif is better suited to proofs than finding attacks. In case of attack, the proof fails,
but proof failure may also come from other reasons: limitations of the tool, assumptions too weak,
inappropriate guidance from the user. Therefore, we only consider in CryptoVerif properties for
which ProVerif did not find attacks. Sometimes, proof failures in CryptoVerif might lead us
towards computational attacks that do not appear at the symbolic level, for instance attacks
that allow an adversary to distinguish between two different data messages but do not allow it
to compute these messages, or attacks that rely on the algorithms of cryptographic primitives.
However, we did not find such attacks in our model of TLS 1.3. We failed to prove forward
secrecy for handshakes that use both pre-shared keys and Diffie-Hellman, but this failure is due
to limitations in our tool, not due to an attack. Our proofs required some unusual assumptions
on public values in Diffie-Hellman groups to avoid confusions between different key exchange
modes; these ambiguities are inherent in Draft-18 but have been fixed in Draft-19, making some
of our assumptions unnecessary.
In comparison with previous cryptographic proofs of draft versions of TLS 1.3 [44, 58, 61],
our cryptographic assumptions and proof structure is similar. The main difference in this work
is that our proof is mechanized, so we can easily adapt and recheck our proofs as the protocol
evolves.
Our full CryptoVerif development consists of 2270 lines, including new definitions and lemmas
for the key schedule (590 lines), a model of the initial handshake (710 lines), a model of PSK-
based handshakes (820 lines), and a model of the record protocol (150 lines). For different proofs,
we sometimes wrote small variations of these files, and we do not count all those variations here.
All proofs completed in about 11 minutes. The total verification effort took about 6 person-weeks
for a CryptoVerif expert.
Verifying TLS Implementations. Specifications for protocols like TLS are primarily focused
on interoperability; the RFC standard precisely defines message formats, cryptographic compu-
tations, and expected message sequences. However, it says little about what state machine these
protocol implementations should use, or what APIs they should offer to their applications. This
specification ambiguity is arguably the culprit for many implementation bugs [15] and protocol
flaws [17] in TLS.
In the absence of a more explicit specification, we advocate the need for verified reference
implementations of TLS that can provide exemplary code and design patterns on how to deploy
the protocol securely. We proposed one such implementation, RefTLS, for use in JavaScript
applications. The core protocol code in RefTLS implements both TLS 1.2 and 1.3 and has
been verified using ProVerif. However, RefTLS is a work-in-progress and many of its trusted
components remain to verified. For example, we did not verify our message parsing code or
cryptographic libraries, and our verification results rely on the correctness of the unverified
ProScript-to-ProVerif compiler [54].
The symbolic security guarantees of RefTLS are weaker than those of computationally-verified
implementations like miTLS [23]. However, unlike miTLS, our analysis is fully automated and it
can quickly find attacks. The type-based technique of miTLS requires significant user intervention
and is better suited to building proofs than finding attacks.
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Other Verification Approaches. In addition to ProVerif and CryptoVerif, there are many
symbolic and computational analysis tools that have been used to verify cryptographic protocols
like TLS. As discussed above, Tamarin [75] was used to symbolically analyze TLS 1.3 Draft-
10 [39]. EasyCrypt [9] has been used to develop cryptographic proofs for various components
used in TLS, including the MAC-Encode-Encrypt construction used in the record layer [6].
Our ProScript-to-ProVerif compiler is inspired by previous works on deriving ProVerif models
from F# [22], Java [7], and JavaScript [18]. Such translations have been used to symbolically
and computationally analyze TLS implementations [20]. An alternative to model extraction is to
synthesize a verified implementation from a verified model; [34] shows how to compile CryptoVerif
models to OCaml and uses it to derive a verified SSH implementation.
The most advanced case studies for verified protocol implementations use dependent type
systems, because they scale well to large codebases. Refinement types for F# have been used to
prove both symbolic [21] and cryptographic security properties, with applications to TLS [23].
The F* programming language [78] has been used to verify small protocols and cryptographic
libraries [82]. Similar techniques have been applied to the cryptographic verification of Java
programs [59].
9 Conclusion and Future Work
TLS 1.3 is a social and technical experiment in the collaborative design of a practical protocol
with regular input and review from the academic research community. It seeks to reverse the tra-
ditional pattern where security analyses are performed several years after standardization, when
it may be too late to change how implementations work. This paper describes our contribution
to this standardization effort.
We present verification results for symbolic models in ProVerif, computational models in
CryptoVerif, and a reference implementation in JavaScript of TLS 1.3 Draft-18. There are
still many features and aspects of the emerging protocol standard that remain to be analyzed.
Furthermore, the formal connections between our ProVerif models, CryptoVerif proofs, and
JavaScript code are not as strong as could be desired. We have focused on proof automation and
readable models as a pragmatic first step, but we are working on formal proofs of correctness for
our translations from Flow to ProVerif and CryptoVerif, so that we can obtain strong guarantees
for our protocol source code.
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Idle(skC , psk)
SentClientHello(k0c )
ReceivedServerHello(modeS[v, kex ], khc , khs )
(TLS 1.2 resumption)












Figure 13: Client state machine
Idle(skS, kt)
SentServerHello(modeS[v, kex ], k0c , khc , khs )
(TLS 1.2 resumption)















Figure 14: Server state machine
[82] J. K. Zinzindohoue, E. Bartzia, and K. Bhargavan. A verified extensible library of elliptic
curves. In IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), pages 296–309, 2016.
A RefTLS Protocol State Machines
Client. The RefTLS client implements the composite state machine shown in Figure 13 for
TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2. Each state represents a point in the protocol where the client is either
waiting for a flight of handshake messages from the server, or it has new session keys that it wishes
to communicate to the record layer. Each arrow is annotated with the name of the function in
RefTLS-CORE API that implements the corresponding state transition. Each transition may
involve processing a flight of incoming messages, changing the session state, and producing a
flight of outgoing messages.
Server. The RefTLS server implements a dual state machine for TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2, as
depicted in Figure 14. The server decides which protocol version and key exchange the handshake
will use, and triggers the appropriate branch in the state machine by sending a ServerHello.
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Like the client, each of its state transition functions corresponds either to a flight of messages or
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